

Current History

A WORLD AFFAIRS MONTHLY

JANUARY, 1971

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Current History

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The problems of the countries of the Middle East have become more acute. In this issue, seven authors examine the situation there. The first article points out that in the Middle East, "United States involvement has increased and its content has been altered, although peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict remains a basic objective."

United States Policy in the Middle East

BY BERNARD REICH

*Project Chairman for Middle East and North African Affairs,
Research Analysis Corporation*

UNTIL WORLD WAR II, United States activities in the Middle East were primarily religious, philanthropic, medical and educational. Official actions generally were limited to cultural and commercial interests and the protection of American citizens.¹ Congress and the President voiced support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine on numerous occasions, but neither was prepared to commit the United States to action in its behalf.²

¹ On this earliest period of United States activity in the Middle East see David H. Finnie, *Pioneers East: The Early American Experience in the Middle East* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967) and John A. DeNovo, *American Interests and Policies in the Middle East 1900-1939* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963).

² The position of the United States on the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine is considered in Carl J. Friedrich, *American Policy Toward Palestine* (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1944); Frank E. Manuel, *The Realities of American-Palestine Relations* (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1949); Reuben Fink (ed.), *America and Palestine: The Attitude of Official America and of the American People Toward a Rebuilding of Palestine as a Free and Democratic Jewish Commonwealth* (New York: American Zionist Emergency Council, 1955).

The United States became actively involved in the Middle East during World War II. Air bases, supply depots and transportation and communications links were established, and troops were stationed in the area. The basic component of United States post-war Middle East policy was the prevention of hostile—particularly Soviet—domination of the region, a policy which was tested initially in Turkey, Iran and Greece.

United States involvement in the Arab-Israeli zone immediately after World War II centered on the emigration from Europe to Palestine of persons displaced by Hitler's anti-Semitic policies. Subsequently, the United States became involved in the future of Palestine when the Mandate was placed before the United Nations in April, 1947. The United States supported the partition plan of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (which provided for independent Jewish and Arab states in Palestine) and it recognized Israel when her independence was proclaimed in May, 1948.

United States policy in the Arab-Israeli sphere began to take shape after the estab-

lishment of Israel and the cessation of the ensuing Arab-Israeli hostilities following the 1949 armistice agreements. In the more than two decades since Israel's independence, the focus of United States policy in this southern zone of the Middle East has been the unresolved conflict between Israel and the Arab states. The United States has maintained the position that settlement of that dispute is essential for Middle East peace and stability and to ensure other United States interests there.³

The United States has tried to reach an accommodation through a variety of programs. It has sought regional stability through such instruments as the proposed Allied Middle East Command. Assurances to Israel and to the Arab states have also been offered in presidential statements that support their political independence and territorial integrity, but no formal "commitments" that require "particular actions in particular circumstances"⁴ have been undertaken. United States endeavors to limit the arms race through programs of arms control in-

cluded the Tripartite Declaration Regarding Security in the Middle East of May, 1950⁵ (with England and France), and a self-imposed limitation of not becoming a principal supplier of military equipment to the Middle East. Programs to foster development have involved technical and economic assistance to Israel and the Arab states.⁶

Efforts to improve the Arab-Israeli situation have often taken the form of specific functional approaches dealing with only a portion of the overall problem. Thus, for example, in the early years of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration, Eric Johnston devised a plan for sharing the waters of the Jordan River, and in 1961-1962 Joseph E. Johnson sought a resolution of the refugee problem. These particular endeavors, as well as broader approaches, had no lasting utility in achieving peace. Stability and the prevention of conflict, as well as support for economic and social change, became the operational objectives of United States policy.

THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION

The June War of 1967 wrought significant changes in the Middle East and in the relationships of the regional states to each other and to extra-regional powers.

In an address on June 19, 1967, President Lyndon Johnson committed the United States to an Arab-Israeli peace based on five principles: the recognized right of national life; justice for the refugees; innocent maritime passage; limits on the wasteful and destructive arms race; and political independence and territorial integrity for all states. He reaffirmed and elaborated this formula in an address to B'nai B'rith on September 10, 1968. The United States goal was to effect a durable Arab-Israeli peace (not simply a cease-fire arrangement), arrived at by the parties to the conflict and not imposed by the powers. A return to the "fragile and perilous armistice"⁷ was rejected; the withdrawal of Israel's forces from territories occupied during the war to recognized and secure boundaries replacing the 1949 armistice lines was to occur in "a context of peace."

The United States arms supply policy also

³ Although United States policy in the Middle East involves many countries and issues beyond the Arab-Israeli conflict and its ancillary problems, the focus here is the United States role in the Arab-Israeli dispute. For a discussion of recent United States policy on other Middle East issues see Bernard Reich, "America in the Middle East: Changing Aspects in U.S. Policy," *The New Middle East*, No. 1, pp. 9-13 (October, 1968) and John C. Campbell, "The Middle East," in Kermit Gordon, editor, *Agenda for the Nation* (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1968), pp. 445-474.

⁴ U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings, U.S. Commitments to Foreign Powers*, 91st Congress, 1st Session (Washington, 1967), pp. 50-51. See also "National Commitments," Report from the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 91st Congress, 1st Session, Report No. 91-129, pp. 26-27.

⁵ *Department of State Bulletin*, June 5, 1950, p. 886.

⁶ The United States provided \$1,811.7 million in economic assistance to the Arab states of the Middle East between 1946 and fiscal year 1967. During this same period, Israel received \$1,075.0 million. A portion of this aid, provided in the form of loans, has been repaid with interest. For further details see Agency for International Development, Statistics and Reports Division, *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations, Obligations and Loans Authorizations, July 1, 1945-June 30, 1969* (April 24, 1970).

⁷ See Ambassador Arthur Goldberg's statement to the U.N. Security Council, June 13, 1967.

underwent modification. Although it suggested that the preferable course was arms control, the United States indicated that it would supply arms if regional conditions dictated such action or if inaction would result in an arms imbalance that could precipitate conflict. In the face of massive Soviet arms supplies to the Arab states, the United States supplied military equipment to Israel. A significant milestone was President Johnson's announcement in October, 1968, that he had ordered negotiations for the sale to Israel of Phantom jets. This followed a sense-of-Congress resolution attached to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1968, which provided that the President should enter into an agreement with Israel for the sale of supersonic planes. On December 27, 1968, the Department of State announced the completion of an agreement for the sale of 50 Phantom F4 jets to Israel.

Since the June War, the United States has been increasingly identified with Israel. This identification was fostered by Soviet pursuit of a diplomacy of polarization and the rupture of diplomatic relations between the United States and seven Arab states.⁸ The United States and Israel have agreed on a common policy. Peace, the security of Israel, the prevention of war, and limitations on the arms race are at the core of the consensus between the two states; however, there is divergence regarding techniques, and there is discord on specific issues.

Efforts to achieve peace and implement the Johnson principles were unsuccessful. The United States supported United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, and the efforts of the United Nations mission of Gunnar Jarring, but it was unable to facilitate a settlement either through collaboration with the states directly involved

or through great power negotiation tactics.

From the outset, the Nixon administration stressed the dangers inherent in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the need for increased United States efforts to resolve the dispute. At his first press conference (January 27, 1969), President Richard Nixon declared:

... I believe we need new initiatives and new leadership on the part of the United States in order to cool off the situation in the Mideast. I consider it a powder keg, very explosive. It needs to be defused. I am open to any suggestions that may cool it off and reduce the possibility of another explosion, because the next explosion in the Mideast, I think, could involve very well a confrontation between the nuclear powers, which we want to avoid.

Subsequently, he defined his "new initiatives" approach—the United States would seek to ameliorate the situation through continuing support of the Jarring mission, bilateral and four-power talks at the United Nations, discussions with Israel and the Arab states, and plans for improving the economic situation in the region.

The June War had indicated to the great powers the dangers of an Arab-Israeli conflict. After the cessation of hostilities, they pursued policies designed to avoid involvement in the conflict. Nonetheless, the United States goal of peace contrasted sharply with the Soviet desire to perpetuate a "no war/no peace" situation. The Johnson administration had been reluctant to enter into potentially fruitless discussions and therefore concentrated on supporting the Jarring mission and regional initiatives.

Acting in support of his "new initiatives" concept, President Nixon agreed to a French proposal for four-power talks on the Middle East if after a preliminary series of bilateral talks among the four powers—particularly the United States and the Soviet Union—such talks proved to be warranted. The United States continued to support the Jarring mission and the efforts of the states in the area. It reassured Israel and the Arab states that it did not seek to dictate or impose a settlement but rather to contribute to their efforts to attain peace.⁹

The permanent representatives to the

⁸ Algeria, Iraq, Sudan, Syria, the United Arab Republic, and Yemen broke relations with the United States at the time of the June War and Southern Yemen (P.R.S.Y.) severed diplomatic relations on October 24, 1969. *Department of State Bulletin*, June 26, 1967, p. 952 and November 17, 1969, p. 420.

⁹ This was reaffirmed by President Nixon in his news conference of February 21, 1969 and by Secretary Rogers in testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on March 27, 1969.

United Nations of France, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the United States met on April 3, 1969, "to begin consideration of how they can contribute to a peaceful political settlement in the Middle East."¹⁰ They based their approach on the November 22 Security Council Resolution and reaffirmed their support for the Jarring mission.

The four-power discussions continued through the fall of 1969, but little was achieved. At that juncture, a unilateral United States initiative was attempted. On December 9, 1969, United States Secretary of State William Rogers reported on the status of the great power discussions and outlined specific proposals for peace. He stated that the goal of United States policy was "a just and lasting peace" to be achieved by pursuit of a "balanced" policy. He reiterated United States support for the principles of the November 22 resolution and for the Jarring mission.¹¹ This was followed by United States proposals for a settlement in the Jordanian-Israeli area.¹² Neither resulted in any perceptible alteration in the situation.

Great power discussions continued during the spring of 1970, but they were overshadowed by developments in the Middle East, particularly along the Suez Canal. Increased Soviet military supplies to Egypt, reports of Soviet pilots flying combat aircraft, and em-

placement of increasingly sophisticated anti-aircraft missiles along the western bank of the canal became concerns of the United States. Secretary Rogers commented on the changed nature of the Arab-Israeli military situation and the increased Soviet presence and activity in the United Arab Republic at the time of the announcement of the June, 1970, initiative:

... a new factor has entered into the equation in the Middle East. The fact that the Soviet Union has assisted, in fact deployed, SA-3's in Egypt, the fact that Soviet pilots are flying planes in Egypt, the fact that there are a large number of Soviet personnel in the UAR, all, of course, present new factors.¹³

INITIATIVE OF JUNE 1970

A new unilateral United States initiative was announced by the Secretary of State on June 25, 1970:

... the United States has undertaken a political initiative, the objective of which is to encourage the parties to stop shooting and start talking under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring in accordance with the resolution of the Security Council.

Our objective in launching this initiative has been to encourage the parties to move towards a just and lasting peace. . . .¹⁴

Rogers proposed that Israel, the United Arab Republic and Jordan restore the cease-fire for at least 90 days and agree to discussions under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring for the purpose of establishing a just and lasting peace based on the November 22 Resolution.¹⁵

This was accompanied by United States indications that it would maintain the military balance which had been adversely affected by recent Soviet activity in Egypt. President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, his Special Assistant on National Security Affairs, emphasized this in a series of statements that underlined the importance of the peace initiative and warned of the potential for superpower conflict. During a nationally-televised "Conversation with the President" on July 1, 1970, the President said:

I think the Middle East now is terribly dangerous. It is like the Balkans before World War I —where the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, could be drawn into a

¹⁰ *Department of State Bulletin*, April 21, 1969, p. 337.

¹¹ "A Lasting Peace in the Middle East: An American View," an address by Secretary of State William P. Rogers, *Department of State Publication* 8507, January, 1970.

¹² The overall thrust of the initiative was discussed during Rogers' news conference of December 23, 1969. See *Department of State Bulletin*, January 12, 1970, pp. 21-28.

¹³ *Department of State Press Release*, No. 193, June 25, 1970, p. 5. See also *New York Times*, April 30, 1970, and *Department of State Bulletin*, June 1, 1970, p. 675.

¹⁴ *Department of State Press Release*, No. 193, June 25, 1970, p. 3.

¹⁵ "U.S. Initiative Toward Peace in the Middle East," *Department of State Bulletin*, August 10, 1970, pp. 178-179. At the time of the announcement of the initiative, Rogers refused to disclose its details because of the sensitive nature of the discussions. The text of a June 19 letter to U.A.R. Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad was not made available until July 22, after its publication in the Egyptian press.

confrontation that neither of them wants because of the differences there.

He declared that the superpowers must work together to bring the problem under control, and he underscored the need to maintain Israel's military superiority in order to prevent conflict. Kissinger noted that the Soviet military buildup in Egypt constituted a dangerous development that portended a possible clash with the United States and that Soviet forces had to be removed from the United Arab Republic.

U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser announced the U.A.R.'s acceptance of the United States proposals on July 23, and Jordan concurred on July 26.¹⁶ Following United States entreaties, Israel transmitted her affirmative reply to the United States on August 4. Israel's acceptance referred to assurances from President Nixon that her agreement to the cease-fire would not jeopardize her position and that the United States was committed to maintain the balance of power in the Middle East.¹⁷

A cease-fire for at least a 90-day period went into effect along the Suez Canal on August 7. It opened the way for peace talks under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring. But the discussions, which began with a view to opening those talks, ran afoul of mistrust engendered by developments along the cease-fire line. Almost immediately, Israel lodged the first of a series of complaints about Egyptian violations. Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan told Israel's Parliament that on the night the cease-fire went into effect the first violation took place. Although there were suggestions that Israel might delay the talks, the initial sessions with Jarring took place on August 25. Israel's Ambassador to the United Nations was called home after that round of meetings between Ambassador Jarring and representatives of the U.A.R., Jordan

and Israel. Subsequently, Israel refused to participate in further discussions until the U.A.R. missile build-up in the cease-fire zone was reversed.

At first, the United States minimized Israel's allegations concerning the cease-fire violations and focused on resuming the talks. But Israel continued her allegations, supplied proof to support her contention and reaffirmed that she would not return to the talks until the matter was resolved. The continuing allegations suggested that the Egyptians and the Soviets were systematically using the cease-fire to alter the military balance along the canal in violation of both the letter and the spirit of the cease-fire agreement.

Several developments in the early fall of 1970 overshadowed the cease-fire violations and complicated Arab-Israeli peace efforts.

In early September, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijacked and destroyed several commercial airplanes and held their passengers in Jordan as hostages for the release of guerrillas interned in several European states. They also hoped to undermine the United States initiative. While the hostages were being detained, a virtual civil war erupted in Jordan between the forces of Jordan's King Hussein and the guerrillas. Syrian intervention threatened to broaden the conflict. The United States sought the release of the hostages and raised the possibility of intervention either in support of King Hussein or to protect American lives and interests. The United States reacted to the Jordan crisis with a highly visible response—Sixth and Atlantic Fleet ships moved toward the eastern Mediterranean; transport aircraft were positioned for the evacuation of American citizens and hostages from Jordan; and military units in the United States and Germany were placed on alert. The movement of men and equipment demonstrated a United States capability to act with resolve in the Middle East and a United States concern for regional stability.

The situation in Jordan was discussed during a previously scheduled meeting between President Nixon and Israeli Premier Golda Meir on September 18, although the cease-

¹⁶ Syria and Iraq opposed the cease-fire from the outset. See *The New York Times*, July 27, 1970. The guerrillas opposed the cease-fire and continued military action against Israel, particularly from Jordan.

¹⁷ See Nixon's comments during a press conference on July 30, 1970, in *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, August 3, 1970, p. 999.

fire violations, the Jarring talks, and United States military equipment for Israel were of central concern. No significant policy changes resulted; both leaders reaffirmed their basic positions.

The United States show of strength during the Jordanian crisis was underscored by President Nixon's visit to the Mediterranean and the United States Sixth Fleet at the end of September. He sought to impress Moscow and the Arab states with a reaffirmation of the United States position and interests in the Mediterranean and to make clear the danger of confrontation if the Soviet Union continued to seek predominance in the Middle East.

While this trip was in progress, U.A.R. President Nasser died. His death reopened such issues as the Soviet role in the U.A.R. and the Middle East, the status of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the June initiative, and the future of United States Middle East policy based on Nasser's special position in Egypt and the Arab world. Preliminary reports indicated that Nasser's policies would be continued and that no basic shift in U.A.R. or Arab policy on the cease-fire and the Jarring mission would occur—continuity of policy and programs was the major theme of U.A.R. spokesmen, including the new U.A.R. President, Anwar el-Sadat.

The Arab-Israeli conflict and the viability of the "stop shooting, start talking" initiative were the central issues during the 25th anniversary session of the United Nations. They were also the subjects of extensive diplomatic maneuvering and intensive debate. The United States sought to extend the cease-fire, to maintain the regional military balance through appropriate supplies to Israel in view of Soviet supplies to Egypt, and to "rectify" the changed military situation resulting from the truce violations, while emphasizing the dangers of conflict, the need to "defuse" the situation and the continuation of negotiations for peace. President Nixon stressed these aims in his address to the United Nations General Assembly on October 23, 1970:

¹⁸ *The New York Times*, October 24, 1970.

It is essential that we and the Soviet Union join in efforts toward avoiding war in the Middle East, and also toward developing a climate in which the nations of the Middle East will learn to live and let live. It is essential not only in the interest of the people of the Middle East themselves, but also because the alternative could be a confrontation with disastrous consequences for the Middle East, for our nations and for the whole world.

Therefore, we urge the continuation of the cease-fire and the creation of confidence in which peace efforts can go forward.¹⁸

TOWARD THE FUTURE

United States policy in the Arab-Israeli zone has undergone substantial evolution in the period since the June War of 1967, particularly when contrasted with the policy followed prior to the conflict. United States involvement has increased and its content has been altered, although peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict remains a basic objective. The United States views the Middle East as an area of potential, if not actual, danger. United States-Soviet rivalry there portends the possibility of confrontation or conflict—a possibility which President Nixon has continually stressed.

It has become increasingly apparent that changes in United States policy since the June War represent a departure from past policy and an intensified concern with the Arab-Israeli conflict. The United States has become a major, if not the major, actor in the area. It has become a principal supplier of sophisticated military equipment and has increasingly been identified, both by Israel and the Arab states, as the major extra-regional power in determining the future course of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Middle East.

Bernard Reich has been the Lecturer and Seminar Leader of the United States Army Civil Affairs Training Program Seminar on the Middle East and North Africa, 1967, and is the author, among other works, of the forthcoming book, *The United States and the Northern Tier: Some Problems of Security and Defense Policy in Turkey and Iran* (MacLean, Virginia: Research Analysis Corporation).

"Since the submission of the [Palestine] problem to the United Nations by the British government on April 2, 1947, it has proved to be . . . the most unyielding problem yet to confront members of the United Nations."

The United Nations in the Middle East

BY HARRY N. HOWARD

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American University*

NOW THAT THE United Nations has passed its twenty-fifth birthday, it is possible to assess its successes and failures, its limitations and shortcomings as an international organization designed to contribute to international peace and security. As the charter was elaborated at San Francisco, the United Nations was established to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war," to "reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights," to establish conditions under which justice and respect for obligations could be maintained, and to "promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom."

These ideals could not be achieved in such a short period of the long human story anywhere in the world, particularly not in the Middle East, because of the complex problems involved. While the United Nations has been able to meet some basic issues, it has failed to meet others, notably in the instance of the unyielding problem of Palestine. For this reason, it has been distrusted by the Arabs, Palestinian and others, and often scorned, vilified and held in open contempt by the state of Israel. Yet it should be recalled that the soldiers and diplomats of the United Nations have played a vital role in the Arab-Israeli conflict and that a United Nations peace-keeping force, since 1964, has held the ring between contending Greek and Turkish ethnic elements on the island of

Cyprus. Whatever its obvious structural and political weaknesses, the United Nations remains the only instrument of international order and justice at the disposal of the peoples of the world.

The United Nations has been confronted with more persistent problems in the Middle East than in any other part of a troubled world. Even at the San Francisco Conference on International Organization, which was devoted to the elaboration of the charter and to the establishment of the new international organization, not to the consideration or solution of substantive problems, issues bearing on the Middle East were brought to the attention of the various delegations. Middle East problems were discussed at times in committees, more often in the corridors. This was true of the question of the withdrawal of Anglo-French troops from Lebanon and Syria, and the question of Soviet pressures on Turkey. But it was especially true of the problem of Palestine, particularly in its relationship to the new trusteeship system which was to be established under the United Nations. At one point, United States Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius observed that "the Palestine question was dangerous. A combination of Palestine and the Arab League was dynamite ready to explode." Still another issue was that of the relationship of the newly formed League of Arab States (March 22, 1945) to the new international

organization. Ultimately, it was to take its place loosely within the United Nations framework, along with other regional arrangements, essentially under Articles 52–54 of the United Nations Charter.¹

The basic issues troubling the Middle East have endured and the United Nations has played an important role in the area in the fields of social and economic development, relief and technical assistance, as well as in the field of international security. Some problems have defied solution—those of Cyprus and Palestine, for example. As early as February, 1946, the Lebanese and Syrian governments brought to the attention of the Security Council the problem of the continued presence of Anglo-French troops in their countries. A satisfactory solution was worked out by the parties directly concerned, but met a Soviet veto, largely on the ground that Great Britain was not sufficiently chastised. The problem was later solved by the parties themselves.

Similarly, in 1946, the Iranian government complained against Soviet intervention in Iran and the Soviet failure to withdraw its troops from northern Iran. Ultimately,

Soviet forces were withdrawn, and Iran assumed control in Azerbaijan in December, 1946.² The problem of Libya, involving the disposition of former Italian colonies after World War II, first came before the General Assembly in September, 1948. After long deliberation, on November 21, 1949, the General Assembly recommended that Libya (Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan) become an independent state as soon as possible and, in any event, not later than January 1, 1952. A U.N. Commissioner and a Council were appointed to assist in the processes leading toward independence and, in fact, Libyan independence was declared on December 24, 1951.³

The role of the United Nations in the Greek case, 1947–1952, was much more significant and enduring, and it involved the United Nations not only in attempts at conciliation and political adjustment, but in the establishment of investigatory and observational machinery. Observation groups stationed along the northern frontiers of Greece set a precedent for later United Nations activities.⁴ The actions taken had much significance not only for Greece in that difficult period immediately after World War II, but for the eastern Mediterranean, Turkey and the Middle East as a whole.

The case came before the United Nations in the fall of 1946 on a complaint of the Greek government that Communist-dominated guerrillas were crossing and crisscrossing the northern frontiers of Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, where they found both sanctuary and training. On December 19, 1946, the Security Council established an 11-member Commission of Investigation Concerning Incidents Along the Northern Frontiers of Greece, representing all members of the Council. The commission duly reported in the spring of 1947, found that the charges were justified, and recommended maintenance of a commission in Greece and the Balkan area to continue observation. This proposal met with five resounding Soviet vetoes. As a result, on November 21, 1947, the General Assembly established a U.N. Special Committee on the Balkans, with in-

¹ See especially Department of State, Historical Office, *Foreign Relations of the States. Diplomatic Papers*. 1945. Volume I, *General: The United Nations* (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), pp. 859–860, pp. 888–889, p. 925, pp. 950–954. For detailed studies of U.N. peacekeeping activities in the Middle East see Rosalyn Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping: Documents and Commentary: The Middle East*. Vol. I (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969); David Wainhouse et al, *International Peace Observation: A History and Forecast* (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966).

² World Peace Foundation, *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1945–1946*, VIII (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1948), pp. 851–859; George Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran, 1918–1948* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1950).

³ Adrian Pelt, *Libyan Independence and the United Nations: A Case of Planned Decolonization* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970). Independence was declared by the former U.N. Commissioner, who played a leading role in the preparations for Libyan independence during 1950–1951, especially in elaborating a constitution.

⁴ Harry N. Howard, "Greece and its Balkan Neighbors (1948–1949): The United Nations Attempts at Conciliation," *Balkan Studies*, VII (1966), pp. 1–26; "United States Policy Toward Greece in the United Nations, 1946–1950," *Ibid.*, VIII, pp. 263–296.

vestigatory and observational functions. That body remained in being until November, 1951, when it was replaced by a Balkan Sub-commission of the Peace Observation Commission, the problem having been solved in the meanwhile.

It is true that the Greek army, retrained and equipped by the United States and the United Kingdom, eliminated the Greek guerrilla effort to overthrow the Greek government and establish a "people's democracy," after the Balkan models. But it is no less true that the United Nations commissions rendered a great service in gathering evidence, pinpointing the essential facts, and highlighting the issues. Had Greece fallen, perhaps to become a Soviet satellite, as United States President Harry Truman advised the Congress on March 12, 1947, "the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East." This, at least, was the view in West Europe and the United States, and it was the possibility that these wider implications were involved that led to the elaboration of the Truman Doctrine concerning aid to Greece and Turkey.⁵

In Lebanon, when revolt broke out against the regime of President Camille Chamoun during May–September, 1958, there were charges of massive intervention in that country on the part of the United Arab Republic. On June 11, 1958, the U.N. Security Council resolved to send an observation group (UNOGIL, composed of some 600 soldiers under the direction of Galo Plaza, former President

of Ecuador, Rajeshwar Dayal of India, and Major General Odd Bull of Norway, to investigate and report, and to "ensure that there" was "no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other material across the Lebanese borders."

It may well be true that the presence of some 15,000 United States troops, who began landing on July 15 in response to the urgent appeal of the Lebanese government, calmed the situation and enabled the Lebanese to choose a successor in accordance with constitutional processes. But it would also appear, despite restrictions on the movement of UNOGIL personnel and the fact that it could find little evidence of massive intervention, that UNOGIL rendered a very useful service. Its principal contribution to the settlement of the crisis lay in its moral influence and in its contribution to the establishment of conditions which helped to separate the domestic crisis from the external complications. During difficulties in Jordan in the same general period, the establishment of a symbolic U.N. presence had a salutary psychological impact. While the U.N. presence remained in Jordan for some years, United States forces left Lebanon on October 25 and British forces were withdrawn from Jordan on November 2, 1958.⁶

The United Nations action in Yemen, following the overthrow of the Imam in September, 1962, involved somewhat similar, if more limited, operations. The problem of Yemen was serious, not only because of its proximity to Saudi Arabia and oil-rich areas, but because of its strategic location on the Red Sea. Soon after the outbreak of the revolt, both the U.A.R. and Saudi Arabia became involved in support, respectively, of the republican and royalist elements, and the U.A.R. dispatched an estimated 30,000–50,000 troops to the area. While the U.N. Secretary General sent U.N. Under Secretary Ralph Bunche to Yemen as early as February, 1963, and asked UNTSO Chief of Staff General Carl von Horn to examine the problems of U.N. observation, it was not until July 4, 1963, that the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM), composed

⁵ See *Congressional Record* (1947), Vol. 99, p. 1999; *Aid to Greece and Turkey: A Collection of State Papers*. The Department of State *Bulletin Supplement*, Vol. XVI, No. 409A (May 4, 1947), pp. 827–909. The President was authorized to withdraw assistance not only when requested by the two governments, or if he thought the purposes had been substantially achieved, but if the Security Council or the General Assembly found that further assistance was unnecessary or undesirable.

⁶ For a convenient selection of pertinent documents see Department of State, *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 1958* (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 944–1067. See also Wainhouse, *op. cit.*, pp. 373–390; Robert Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors* (New York: Pyramid Books, 1965), ch. 27.

of some 200 officer-observers, began to function under General von Horn.

The essential UNYOM function was to supervise the implementation of an agreement on the part of the U.A.R. and Saudi Arabia, worked out by United States Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, to withdraw assistance to the contending parties and not to attempt political settlement or peace-keeping. While the task of fact-finding was well implemented, the task of mediation and conciliation proved impossible. The mission was terminated on September 4, 1964. In evaluating the work of UNYOM, it should be recalled that the mission was small in numbers; the terrain was very rugged; the physical conditions were severe; and local supplies and facilities were meager. U.N. personnel and equipment, moreover, were often subject to gunfire and were frequently in danger. Nevertheless, it was clear to the Secretary General that the mission had "exercised an important restraining influence on hostile activities in the area"—which was a primary reason for sending it to Yemen.⁷

ROLE IN CYPRUS

The United Nations did not begin to play a role in Cyprus until 1964, although informally the question had come before various bodies in the United Nations as early as 1950. While an independent republic of Cyprus was established in 1960, the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, to say nothing of Greece and Turkey, were unable to resolve their problems relative to the island. During 1963–1964, further open conflict threatened, with all the implications which it might have for NATO, the eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East. As a result, on March 4, 1964, the Security Council unanimously resolved to establish the United Nations Force

in Cyprus (UNFICYP), under the command of UNEF General P. S. Gyani and composed of some 6,000 troops from the United Kingdom, Canada, Finland, Ireland and Sweden. Attempts at mediation and conciliation, both within and outside the United Nations, were unsuccessful. The Secretary General reported in September, 1970, that "no significant change" had occurred during the year, but, "by and large," "peace and quiet" had obtained on the islands. The elements for a political settlement existed, and despite financial difficulties, the UNFICYP had "steadfastly continued its efforts to maintain quiet on the island and to return the life of its citizens to normality," which, however, would "not be possible until the parties find a solution to the basic issues."⁸

THE PALESTINE PROBLEM

Like the Cyprus problem, the question of Palestine involved intractable issues of contending nationalisms over the same piece of land. Since the submission of the problem to the United Nations by the British government (which held the mandate of the League of Nations) it has proved to be the most complex and the most unyielding problem yet to confront members of the United Nations. In one form or another, the Palestine issue has been before the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations more consistently, more regularly and more frequently than any other single question during the past 25 years, and no "solution" is even yet in sight. The origins of the problem as we know it today may be traced to the General Assembly's resolution of November 29, 1947, which had recommended the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state, with Jerusalem and its Holy Places sacred to Jews, Christians and Muslims as an international *corpus separatum*, and cooperation between the two communities.

One result of the recommendation was the intensification of the conflict between Jews and Arabs in Palestine, beginning in the spring of 1948. Subsequently, President Truman, during March–April, 1948, sought to

⁷ See Wainhouse, *op. cit.*, pp. 421–455; John S. Badeau, *The American Approach to the Arab World* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), ch. VII; Major-General Carl von Horn, *Soldiering for Peace* (New York: McKay, 1967), chs. 24–25; Manfred W. Wenner, *Modern Yemen, 1918–1966* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), ch. VIII. For convenient documentation see Department of State, *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents 1963*, pp. 601–614; 1964, pp. 724–729.

⁸ See U.N. Doc. A/8001, Add. 1, paras. 51–54; Wainhouse, *op. cit.*, pp. 441–460.

backtrack into a United Nations trusteeship over Palestine when he saw that the partition plan could not be implemented peacefully.⁹ The conflict continued throughout 1948 and, basically, it has continued more or less violently (1956, 1967) to the present. Count Folke Bernadotte, as United Nations Mediator, sought unsuccessfully to conciliate the parties and paid with his life—at the hands of Jewish terrorists—in the process, although Ralph Bunche, as Acting United Nations Mediator, worked out a series of armistice agreements during February–July, 1949.

During the same period United Nations peace-keeping and peace-observation machinery was established—the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization—to keep watch over violations of the truce and armistice agreements. Drawn from the military forces of a number of states—the United States, France, Canada, Sweden, Norway, Ireland, and so forth—and numbering at various times some 700 personnel, the UNTSO performed indispensable services in arranging cease-fires and presenting unbiased reports to the United Nations Security Council as a basis for resolutions which attempted to deal with the continuing conflict. Despite the severe restrictions which were often placed on the movements of the UNTSO, that body was able to act as a deterrent, limiting the hostile activities of both parties to the conflict. The Mixed Armistice Commissions (Israeli-Lebanese, Israeli-Syrian, Israeli-Jordanian, and Israeli-Egyptian) served, in effect, as part and parcel of the UNTSO machinery. While there has been much propaganda against the UNTSO, its work needs to be put into perspective, and it may be observed that substantially since 1951 the Israeli government refused to cooperate with the Israeli-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission, as it refused

to cooperate with the Israeli-Egyptian MAC after 1956.¹⁰

Similarly, the work of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), established in November, 1956, in the immediate wake of the Israeli-Anglo-French attack against Egypt, needs to be put into perspective. With some 5,000–6,000 soldiers, drawn largely from “neutral” states, this body performed most effectively in the Gaza Strip and on the Sinai Peninsula in maintaining the peace along the Israeli-Egyptian demarcation lines, and its success there probably contributed to easing the situation elsewhere. It was withdrawn on May 18, 1967, on Egyptian demand, immediately prior to the June, 1967, *blitzkrieg*. But in fact Israel had never permitted it to function on Israeli-held territory, on the ground that such action would prejudice Israel’s sovereignty.

The Conciliation Commission for Palestine, established in January, 1949, and composed of representatives of France, Turkey and the United States, set forth comprehensive proposals for peace during 1949–1951, which neither Israel nor the Arab states accepted. After 1951, it was able only to bring about the unfreezing of Arab blocked accounts in banks in Israel (some \$10,000,000). Despite the efforts of Special Representative Joseph E. Johnson during 1961–1962, it could do nothing with regard to the problems of Arab refugee repatriation, or resettlement with compensation, under a free and realistic choice for the refugees, since the Israeli government rejected any substantial repatriation and the Arab governments were skeptical as to resettlement. On the other hand, the Arab governments did a great deal to assist the refugees, providing some \$130 million in direct and indirect assistance over the years, while UNRWA continued to provide relief, health and education services to some 1,400,000 refugees.

The Conciliation Commission is now substantially out of the picture; after the June, 1967, conflict the problem was placed in other hands. On November 22, 1967, the United Nations Security Council laid down the general guidelines for a possible general settle-

⁹ The most comprehensive study is that of Fred J. Khouri, *The Arab-Israeli Dilemma* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968). See also Nadav Safran, *From War to War: The Arab-Israeli Confrontation* (New York: Pegasus, 1969).

¹⁰ Wainhouse, *op. cit.*, pp. 272–273. See also the memoirs of two UNTSO Chiefs of Staff: Lieutenant-General E. L. M. Burns, *Between Arab and Israeli* (New York: Obolensky, 1962); Major-General Carl von Horn, *Soldiering for Peace* (New York: McKay, 1967).

ment, which stressed the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area could live in peace and security.¹¹ A just and lasting peace under the resolution would include the application of two basic principles: 1) the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the conflict; and 2) the termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and its right to live peacefully within secure and recognized boundaries.

The resolution also affirmed the necessity of 1) guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; 2) achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; and 3) guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones.

United Nations Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring was chosen as the Secretary General's emissary to bring the parties together for peaceful adjustment, but he has thus far been unable to do so. Since the spring of 1969, discussions have taken place (for the most part within the United Nations framework) among France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States; and on June 25, 1970, the United States revealed a new initiative, suggesting a cease-fire based on the principles of the U.N. resolution of November 22, 1967. These were steps in the

right direction and they were accepted by the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Israel. A 90-day cease-fire began on August 7. The United States proposals were flawed in their failure to make explicit provision for consideration of the Palestinian demand for participation in any discussions and for self-determination. Subsequently, there was renewed violence in Jordan during September-October, 1970, and serious charges and counter-charges of cease-fire violations were made both by Israel and by the Arab states.

If there is to be a settlement of the long-standing conflict, it seems clear that the Palestinian demand for self-determination based on free and realistic choice can no longer be ignored.¹² Similarly, whatever the skepticism and mistrust, the United Nations will have to play a continuing role in new security arrangements, either through an enlarged and strengthened UNTSO, or a force like that of UNEF. While some observers have proposed an additional special United States guarantee to Israel within this framework, it is possible that the Locarno formula, with guarantees against a possible aggressor, might prove less prejudicial in concept and more acceptable in practice.¹³

From the cases examined, it would appear that the United Nations has had limited success in dealing with problems in Lebanon, Syria and Iran in 1946; its investigatory and observational functions were well performed in Greece, and somewhat less well in Yemen. In the instance of Cyprus, the United Nations Force has certainly contributed to the maintenance of a degree of stability and order, even if the solution of basic problems of national and communal conflict has not been achieved.

The United Nations has not succeeded in
(Continued on page 49)

¹¹ See Arthur Lall, *The U.N. and the Middle East Crisis, 1967* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968).

¹² On this aspect see Don Peretz, Evan M. Wilson and Richard J. Ward, *A Palestine Entity?* (Washington, D. C.: Middle East Institute, 1970); Senator Mark Hatfield, "Search for Peace in the Middle East," *Congressional Record*, Vol. 116, No. 99, S9021-9039; Lord Caradon, "A Plan for Peace," *The Sunday Times* (London), July 5, 12, 19, 1970.

¹³ See Senator J. William Fulbright, "Old Myths and New Realities—II. The Middle East," Address of August 24, 1970, *Congressional Record*, vol. 116, no. 147; John C. Campbell, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict: An American Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1970, pp. 51-69; Nahum Goldmann, "The Future of Israel," *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1970, pp. 443-459.

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"The relentless outpouring of hatred against Israel and Zionism is in reality the expression of the deep Soviet frustration in the Middle East," writes this specialist, who notes that "a careful examination reveals that even without the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Soviets would have been unable to make rapid progress in the Middle East. . . ."

The Soviet Role in the Middle East Crisis

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IN ORDER TO ASSESS the nature and importance of the role of the Soviet Union in the Middle East crisis, it is necessary to outline Soviet aims in the region, the methods employed to achieve them, the frustrations faced and the resultant anger which characterize Moscow's reactions.*

Succinctly stated, the Soviet Union's objectives in the Middle East have been to break through to the warm water ports of the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, to establish the region as a Soviet sphere of influence for political and economic exploitation, and to extend Communist ideology and practice. These aims were determined by a mixture of historical Russian ambitions and international power rivalry, by geopolitical factors, by military considerations and socio-ideological revolutionary motivation.

The first task for the Soviet Union was the removal of the security danger posed at least potentially by Turkey and Iran. These states could serve as bases from which enemies might launch attacks against the Soviet Union, because they are situated along its very borders. Both these countries had experienced the pressures of Russian power and were wary of Russian expansion. They both had ac-

cumulated a fund of fear and suspicion of Russian aims and were determined to rebuff the Soviet overtures and to seek outside help against possible penetration, if not invasion.

The second Soviet task was to penetrate the heartland of the Middle East and establish it as a sphere of Soviet influence as well as of economic expansion and exploitation. This Soviet ambition, which antedated the Communist revolution, was methodically and successfully frustrated by the Western powers before World War I and during the war and interwar period.

The third task was to draw the Middle East region into the area of Communist revolutionary conquest.

Soviet methods of achieving these objectives were complex and contained many unknown factors, but the pattern emerged clearly after World War II. First, the Soviets attempted to remove Western influence. Although the war had seriously shaken and weakened the Western position in the region, the Western powers were still sufficiently entrenched to present obstacles, if not outright danger, to Soviet aims. Direct pressure was, therefore, applied to both Turkey and Iran. However, the Western powers, especially the United States, showed determined resistance, and the Soviet policy planners could not succeed.

The first real opportunity for the Soviets

* The reader would be advised to refer to two previous articles by the author which appeared in *Current History*: "The Soviet Union in the Middle East," February, 1967, p. 116; "Soviet Posture in the Middle East," December, 1967, pp. 368 ff.

to advance their goals came when Great Britain brought the Palestine question to the United Nations. In spite of British obstruction and United States hesitation and backtracking, the only possible solution of the problem was the partition of the country into Jewish and Arab states. Although the Soviet Union historically and ideologically opposed Zionism, it consistently and methodically approved partition. It became clear even then that partition would mark the first step in the removal of the most powerful Western force in the region—the British.¹ The refusal of the Mandatory to accept partition as a solution made the task of the Soviet Union that much easier. The Soviet spokesmen staunchly supported partition and advocated the establishment of two states, a Jewish state and an Arab state. Once the British mandate was ended, Moscow became the champion of the Arab cause against Israel and Zionism.

In their decision to play the role of protectors of the Arabs against Zionist “expansionism,” the Soviet policy-makers were interested in more than numbers—2 million Jews against 40 million Arabs—they were

aware of the fact that the Arab states comprised the heartland of the region which was the direct object of Soviet expansionism. The Soviets could not have advanced their cause significantly by supporting little Israel in a sea of Arab hostility. On the other hand, if the Arabs were represented as the victims of Western imperialism and Israel was portrayed as imperialism’s willing tool, Soviet ambitions could make headway.

However, the real problem that plagued and still plagues the Kremlin policy-makers is ideological. Were the Middle Eastern states ready for the social revolution which would ultimately establish Communist regimes, even of local varieties? The objective “scientific” factors necessary for the establishment of social revolutions are lacking in Middle Eastern societies. Hence no predictable pattern could emerge.

This preoccupation with the ideological problem is not primarily a philosophical concern. It reflects the Soviet fear that all the Soviet investments of money, effort, and political and diplomatic exertions might be wasted and that the Communist cause might be betrayed. If the social revolutions were not inevitable, Arab leaders might turn from socialism to extreme nationalism and even to capitalism.²

In the last few years the Soviet Union has made some progress in Turkey and Iran, the two countries along its borders. Because of their disappointments with help from the West and because of reduced fear of a possible attack, Turkey and Iran have developed better relations with the Soviet Union and tension has been somewhat relaxed. Yet while the Soviet Union has traveled a long way in penetrating the Arab Middle East, and has established itself as the loyal, devoted friend and supporter of the Arab cause, it faces the greatest frustration of its modern ambitions in this area. After World War II, the West had been practically removed. The British left Palestine, then Egypt, Sudan, Iraq, Jordan and, recently, even Libya. The French first left the Levant states and then North Africa. The Soviet Union established good diplomatic relations with all of these

¹ In retelling the story of partition, a Soviet writer explained the Soviet Union’s support for partition and the opposition of Britain and the United States to it: “Peace in Palestine could have helped to establish a united anti-imperialist front in the Middle East, and that was what the oil barons of the USA and Britain were against.” S. Astakhov, “More About the Secret Springs of the Israeli Aggression,” *International Affairs* (Moscow), October, 1967. In an article, “The Soviet Union and the Developing Countries,” *International Affairs* (Moscow), January, 1969, A. Lavrishev gave a full recital of Soviet support in international bodies for the struggle of Middle Eastern countries for national liberation from 1946 to the end of 1968, but he said nothing about the Soviet role in the adoption of the Palestine Partition Plan by the United Nations General Assembly.

² At the end of September, 1967, after the Khartoum Conference, two outstanding Soviet experts on the Middle East painted the former Egyptian Minister of War and Deputy Commander-in-Chief Abdul Hakim Amer, President Nasser’s most trusted and closest friend, as a traitor to Egypt and to socialism and blamed him in part for the June defeat. They reported that the generals and colonels in Amer’s entourage claimed that “The Soviet Union was to blame for everything.” The Soviet writers explained that “The middle classes of the UAR where many of the leaders of the Egyptian revolution had their origin, are notorious for their inconsistency.” See “The Situation in the Arab World,” in *New Times* (Moscow), September 27, 1967.

liberated states, and with some it established close military and economic ties. Indeed, the Soviets described some of these countries as "progressives" who had abandoned "capitalism" and were on their way to becoming "socialist" states. Moreover, the Western powers, especially the British, were about to withdraw completely from the Persian Gulf area, which would become a political and military vacuum which the Soviet Union would be eager and able to fill.

And yet the Soviet Union is frustrated in its drive in the Middle East. The cause, it would seem, is Israel, the new Jewish, Zionist state, a state which the Soviet Union itself, in a sense, helped to establish.

To understand Soviet frustration, some basic tenets of Soviet policy must be examined. Both the West and the Soviet Union assumed that Arab unity was a force which would operate among the Arabs to unify them as a powerful force. But as it turned out, despite literally hundreds of books, articles and slogans, the dream of Arab unity had deluded the Arabs, the West and the Soviet Union. All Arabs could not agree on any economic, political or diplomatic issue which might lead them to submerge their differences for the sake of overall Arab national interests. All Arabs agreed on only one issue—opposition to Israel. The Soviet Union utilized this opposition to buy Arab friendship and adherence. Apparently it hoped that it could exploit this issue to bring all the Arab states under one great movement that would serve Soviet ends.³

For the Kremlin policy planners, the real struggle was against the West; the Soviet Union was determined to dominate the Middle East and remove all vestiges of Western

interests. Thus while the Arabs were concentrating on resisting Israel, the Soviet Union tried to portray Israel as the agent of the West. To maintain their position of friendship with the Arabs, the Soviet leaders responded positively to Arab demands, and when the Arabs prepared militarily against Israel, the Soviet Union supplied billions of dollars worth of arms and equipment.

In the maneuvering of 1967, the Soviet Union was hoping for a political and diplomatic victory for the Arabs and for itself, their backer and mentor, for a calamitous humiliation for Israel and a diplomatic defeat for the West. Instead, the Arabs were disastrously defeated and the Soviet Union was embarrassed and humiliated. Moreover, some of the "progressive" Arab leaders blamed the Soviet Union for the defeat and for forcing the Arab states to agree to the cease-fire order of the Security Council.

Israel shattered the grand scheme for a Soviet-Arab alliance; thereafter, Moscow had to reconstruct a new pattern of cooperation. The Arab cry for the annihilation of Israel did not fit well into Soviet tactics, and many Soviet spokesmen repeatedly protested that the elimination of Israel was not Soviet policy. Nor was there room for the Arab guerrillas in the scheme of Soviet policy; the guerrillas were not motivated by socialistic progressive ideology and were not controllable or accountable to any authority.

In reshaping a new policy, the Soviet Union represented Israel as the spearhead of Western, United States imperialism, and declared that because of the help extended by the socialists to the Arabs, Israel's effort had been foiled. Right after the Six-Day War, an editorial in *New Times* (Moscow) outlined the West's objective:

Employing Israel as a battering ram, the imperialist powers hoped to topple progressive Arab regimes, to set off a wave of counter-revolution in the Middle East, and to isolate the Arab states from the socialist countries. They were prompted not by any threat to their own security, but by a striving to deprive the Arab peoples of their achievements.

But this was not to be.

At this critical moment the Soviet Union and

³ It is of interest to note that as late as October, 1967, a Soviet Middle East expert wrote that the Arab League was a foreign creation. "British diplomacy hoped to rely on the League of Arab States set up in 1945 with obvious British participation, and which at the time united the reactionary feudal rulers of these countries." *International Affairs* (Moscow), October, 1967. But an article titled "Arab States' Organization," which appeared in the same magazine in February-March, 1970, described the Arab League as the first genuine Arab move to unite against the foreign oppressors. Not a hint is given as to the role of the British in the formation of the League.

other socialist countries, true to the internationalism underlying all their policies but also prompted by considerations of their own security, stand shoulder to shoulder with the Arab states. . . . It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the support given by the socialist countries to the national-liberation movement in the Middle East has a direct bearing on every major gain made by this movement in the past 10 or 15 years.

At first Moscow propaganda followed the Arab line that Israel alone did not defeat the Arabs, but that the United States and Great Britain were actively and directly involved. However, the Kremlin policy makers soon realized the danger involved in such a charge, which would have amounted to an accusation of direct belligerency threatening international peace, and would have been a compelling justification for Soviet intervention on the Arab side.

The Soviet Union soon took the position that the direct and immediate enemy was Israel. The issue, Soviet propagandists declared, was not Palestine Arab nationalism versus Jewish nationalism, but Arab national liberation-progressive socialism in alliance with the socialistic forces in the world, versus Israel, the tool of Western imperialism. Thus, Soviet propaganda refused consistently to view the struggle as one between the two superpowers.

Slowly at first, and then in a faster tempo, the Soviet Union continued to rearm the Arabs, especially the U.A.R. When the U.A.R. renounced the United Nations cease-fire order on March 29, 1969, and proclaimed a policy of attrition, the Soviet Union went along. After the Israelis penetrated deep into the U.A.R., in response to the war of attrition, the Soviet Union supplied the U.A.R. with more modern military equipment to stop Israeli raids. Finally, when Israel responded to the concentration of military power along the Suez Canal zone, the Soviet Union began building SA-2 and SA-3 missiles to prevent Israel from utilizing her superior air power and introduced Soviet personnel to operate these missiles and even to pilot some of the advanced military jet aircraft.

One of the major complaints of the Kremlin in connection with the Middle East has

been the almost systematic exclusion of Soviet personnel from the many international agencies and bodies that have been active in the Middle East. On every occasion when such bodies were organized, the Soviet Union was excluded; consequently it has refused to recognize them or to share in the cost of their operation.

INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION

The June, 1967, war gave the Soviet Union another opportunity to try to insinuate itself into the Middle East situation, exploiting the United Nations. On July 9, the Soviet delegate, N. T. Federenko, warned that if Israel continued to ignore the Security Council's decisions, sanctions would have to be applied against her as an aggressor. Should the Council take this course of action, the U.S.S.R. would help to implement the sanctions. The Soviet Union wanted to sit as judge and jury, and to act as prosecutor as well.

When, therefore, French President Charles de Gaulle advocated four-power consultations as a method of resolving the Middle East crisis, Moscow welcomed the proposal wholeheartedly. The French sided with the Arab states and the Soviet Union; Great Britain was eager, for purely economic reasons, to see peace in the region and would not take a hard position. The United States would be practically isolated. After long hesitation, the United States finally agreed to four-power consultations; this was a triumph for Soviet tactics.

The four-power consultations subsequently became two-power consultations between the U.S.S.R. and the United States, and that suited Moscow even better. The Soviets counted on the United States genuine desire for peace and stability in the region, remembered that Washington would want to demonstrate its even-handed policy between the Arabs and the Israelis, and assumed that the Americans, almost hopelessly involved in the Vietnam war, would not be ready to face another conflict far away from home. Thus they took an uncompromising position and almost unreservedly supported Arab demands.

Every proposal the United States put forward was publicly rejected out of hand. Every proposal that came from the United States Department of State was analyzed and proved unacceptable.

However, when the war of attrition had escalated and the Soviet Union became more deeply involved, there appeared a real danger that the United States might adopt a negative position in the consultations; this the Soviets could not afford. In June, 1970, therefore, the State Department was encouraged to advance its cease-fire proposal, known as the Rogers plan. After some hesitation, Moscow accepted it; and finally President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the U.A.R.—after a prolonged visit in Moscow in July, 1970—accepted it. Israel was reluctant to accept the cease-fire proposal without sufficient guarantees that it would not be utilized to her disadvantage. This was exactly what Moscow hoped for: it appeared that Israel was stubbornly refusing to permit peace to come to the Middle East. This, Moscow believed, would force Washington to apply pressure on Jerusalem, and would inevitably create tension—most desirable from Moscow's point of view—between the United States and Israel. At the same time a better understanding, if not a more relaxed relationship, between the Soviet Union and the United States would develop.

The Western press was ready with an explanation for this supposedly about-face in the Kremlin. It reported that the Soviet leaders had second thoughts about their policy; that the Arab demands had become more and more unreasonable; that the economic costs of the war, to the Soviets and to the U.A.R., were becoming too taxing; that the military losses of the Arabs had become too heavy; and that the Soviets therefore "advised" President Nasser to accept the Rogers proposal. This analysis played directly into Soviet hands, for it encouraged the State Department to believe that the United States was on the right path to a peaceful solution of the almost unsolvable Middle East problem.

What were the real issues for President

Nasser in mid-1970? The immediate zone of the Suez Canal was not protected against superior Israeli air power. While the Soviets had built up missile batteries in the interior of the U.A.R., they had not succeeded in doing so in the Canal zone. The Egyptians needed a respite from Israeli air attacks in order to fortify the Canal zone with missiles to neutralize Israeli air power. Once the danger from Israeli air attacks had been eliminated or at least reduced, Egyptian armor and artillery could cross the canal and fight the enemy in the Sinai peninsula.

For their part, the Israelis, whose armor and artillery along the canal were by no means comparable to that of the Egyptians, were not ready to agree to the cease-fire proposal without guarantees that the Egyptians would not take advantage of the cease-fire. The United States assured Israel that the cease-fire would be effective, and that during the 90 days there would be a standstill zone on either side of the canal. Washington was assured by both the U.A.R. and the Soviet Union that the standstill provision of the cease-fire agreement would be observed.

It now appears that the Soviet Union and President Nasser plotted to accept the Rogers plan in order to deploy missiles throughout the Canal zone during the 90-day cease-fire. At the same time, while indirect negotiations were going forward, the United States would not supply Israel with additional arms and equipment to maintain the balance. This would inevitably place Israel in a defenseless position on the Sinai border, and her negotiating position would be seriously weakened. At the same time, the negotiations would offer a possibility of peace, and the United States might pressure Israel to accept the Arab terms. Thus the 1956 tactic might be repeated, this time without war.

In the June War of 1967, Washington had achieved a very serious slow-down of Soviet objectives through the victory of Israel over the Arabs. This seriously reduced Soviet prestige among the Arabs and throughout the world. The closing of the Suez Canal and Jerusalem's stubborn insistence that the canal could not be cleared and reactivated

without Israel's consent had handicapped Moscow. The Soviet Union was unable to send supplies to North Vietnam quickly through the Suez Canal. Even more serious was the inability of the Soviets to make headway in the Persian Gulf area, and from there towards the Indian Ocean. The capitulation of Israel and the reopening of the canal would be considered a resounding defeat for the United States.

But the Israelis refused to be partners to a scheme for their own defeat. They obtained assurances that the standstill provision would be observed; that their military position during the cease-fire period would not be eroded; and that negotiations under United Nations Representative Gunnar Jarring would be based on the realities existing at the time of the cease-fire. When, therefore, they became convinced that the standstill provision was being violated, the Israelis withdrew from the negotiations with Jarring and insisted that the missile batteries must be dismantled before they would return to the indirect negotiations table. They apparently convinced the United States government of the validity of their charges.

The consequent confidence crisis between the superpowers made the Nixon administration indicate its willingness to redress the military imbalance. The United States thus offered to supply Israel with heavy armor which would bolster her position in the Sinai peninsula along the Suez Canal. Washington subsequently charged that neither the Egyptians nor the Soviets were sincere in their undertakings and had betrayed the United States confidence.

Moscow was not ready to capitulate; what it had failed to achieve in 1967, it was trying to achieve in 1970. The only resolution on the books of the United Nations was a Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, which was a balanced package deal calling for Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories with reciprocal conditions from the Arabs. Although all the states involved, except Syria, had accepted the resolution, its meaning was differently interpreted by the different parties to the conflict.

The interpretation of this Security Council resolution had become a real obstacle to Soviet policy, and Moscow attempted to supersede it by a new General Assembly resolution which would fully support the Arab position. The immediate Soviet objectives were to abolish the reciprocal provisions, and to force Israel (and indirectly, the United States) to negotiate in spite of the cease-fire violations. This was successfully achieved on November 4, 1970, when an Afro-Asian draft resolution subsequently amended and somewhat softened by France was adopted, against United States opposition, by a vote of 57 to 16 with 37 abstentions. France, of course, voted for it, and Britain abstained.

The challenge that Israel offered to the Soviet Union in its efforts to gain dominance in the Middle East and to remove United States influence from the area was unacceptable to the Soviet leaders. The anger and the subsequent frustration generated by this challenge brought on a vicious anti-Zionist campaign in the Soviet press. As if to add insult to injury, the Israeli-Jewish "conspiracy" dared to bring charges of mistreatment of Jews in the Soviet Union. The old czarist charges of Jewish international conspiracy were openly and officially revived. Zionism was said to be an international organization working with imperialism with one aim in mind: to prevent the progressive national liberation movement from coming to power

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Israeli Politics Since the 1967 War*

BY NADAV SAFRAN

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THE 1967 JUNE WAR, together with its prelude and aftermath, has had a powerful and far reaching impact on the Israeli political system. A great diversity of substantive views on the issues raised by the war has been barely contained within a framework of unity on the intraparty as well as the interparty level. The system has therefore had a very limited capacity to take the initiative on these issues; its evolution from the present state of "suspended motion" will depend primarily on external events.

The key to the evolution of the Israeli political system since the 1967 war is to be found in the May-June crisis that preceded it. By the last week of May, 1967, virtually all Israelis perceived the situation as presenting a clear and imminent danger of destruction for their state, for themselves as a people and even as individuals. In the light of the subsequent course of events, these fears may appear highly exaggerated and unjustified; nevertheless, they were experienced as real.

As far as the people of Israel were concerned, the crisis did not focus so much on the actions of U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser or the position of Washington, Moscow, London and Paris, as on the timid and fearful reaction of their government under Premier Levi Eshkol. This reaction, in the view of Israelis, could only be interpreted either as a sign that Zahal (Israel's

armed forces) might not be able to counter the Arab military threat or as an indication of weak and indecisive civilian leadership. Since faith in Zahal had been nurtured in Israel for 20 years and doubts about Eshkol's competence as Minister of Defense had been fostered by political opponents like David Ben-Gurion for some time, the majority of Israelis were inclined to doubt Eshkol even while being apprehensive about their army.

The grumblings that ensued reached their peak after Eshkol's speech of May 29, 1967, in which he informed a tense nation of the government's decision to continue exploring the possibilities of a solution to the crisis that would not necessitate Israel's going to war. This stimulated a project that had been previously set afoot by some politicians to have General Moshe Dayan replace Eshkol as Minister of Defense.

The success of the project dramatically demonstrated the change that the crisis wrought in the Israeli political system. The proposal for the appointment of Dayan had originated outside the political coalition altogether, in consultations that had brought together leaders of the opposition parties who had not exchanged a greeting in their lives. It was endorsed by the National Religious party, a partner in the ruling coalition, and was forcefully put forward by its leader in the Cabinet against strong opposition on the part of Eshkol. Finally, as the popular grumblings reached their peak, the proposal

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was endorsed by a majority vote of the leadership of Eshkol's own party, Mapai, thus forcing Eshkol to accept the decision of his own party or resign. After this erosion of traditional political allegiances, alliances and hostilities, the formation of a national coalition government embracing all parties except the Communists was the only logical sequel.

Eshkol's sense of weakness gravely detracted from his ability to lead the nation in the pursuit of the political prospects opened up by Israel's brilliant victory. His first task was to define Israel's postwar aims.

While the war was still going on, Eshkol had formally declared that Israel sought no conquest and no annexation from the war but that lasting peace was her only aim. Two days later, however, in a solemn moment before the Wailing Wall right after the capture of the Old City of Jerusalem at great cost in blood, Dayan made a declaration on his own to the effect that the Israelis had returned to Jerusalem and would never be parted from it again. Dayan's oath received unanimous Israeli endorsement and turned out to be the first of many unilateral statements and deeds by Dayan and others which diverged widely from the letter and spirit of Eshkol's definition of Israel's aims.

Had the Prime Minister been someone other than Eshkol, or had Eshkol himself not suffered recently the humiliation of partial repudiation by his party, his political allies and the nation, he might have stuck to his own position and sought to impose it on the party and the government. But Eshkol kept quiet for fear of facing another crisis in the government and the party and hoped that his own declaration would be forgotten. In the absence of a firm leadership, there developed an unchecked debate which increasingly fragmented Israeli opinion.

MAPAI'S POSITION

The consequences of Eshkol's failure to press his own views on the postwar aims of Israel might have been corrected in the course of elections scheduled for October, 1969, had his party been willing to prepare for entering these elections by working out a concrete

program regarding the postwar issues. The thrashing out of a specific position by Mapai would have forced the other parties to do likewise, and the outcome would have been a general realignment of opinion around a set of alternative programs. However, after a few faint efforts in that direction, Mapai gave up the attempt.

Mapai was reluctant to pursue the statement of a specific position partly because of the record of some of its leaders in the government during the crisis, especially the nearly fatal hesitation of Eshkol. An attempt by the party as such to justify his record might have alienated some of the electorate and perhaps would have predetermined some policy choices unnecessarily; while an attempt to disavow it would alienate the leaders associated with it and would amount to a politically damaging admission of fault. Another reason for Mapai's reluctance was the enormous popularity gained by Moshe Dayan, a non-Mapai man, for his role in achieving victory. Attempts were made to deflect some of Dayan's glory to Zahal or to General Itzhak Rabin, and to build up Yigal Allon, a 1948 war hero, as an attractive rival leader; but these proved to be abortive when a "Dayan for Premier" movement developed and gathered an impressive number of adherents in a short period of time.

A third reason was the unknown effect on public opinion of the participation of Herut (Gachal) in the government for the first time in its history. Ever since 1955, the drift of Israel's orientation in matters of security and foreign policy had been in the direction of greater toughness and a reliance on the nation's armed forces, a policy generally associated with Herut. Now that Herut was at last given the imprimatur of respectability and responsibility, and now that the biggest victory of Israel's armed forces had opened up the option of expansion that Herut had long advocated, the danger of a major shift in political strength in an electoral showdown based on specific programs appeared particularly grave.

Since Mapai feared the outcome of an attempt to realign opinion around coherent

alternative programs, it resorted to an effort to unify existing party organizations by avoiding clear and openly contested alternatives. On one level, this effort took the form of deliberately prolonging the life of the national coalition on the basis of an agreement that the government would not take a position on the basic options and issues facing the country as long as none of the partners thought that an option it favored was ripe for realization or was being foreclosed. In effect, this meant that the government committed itself to a definition of Israel's position in the essentially procedural terms of insisting on negotiations aimed at achieving peace, thus leaving all the options open, as long as the Arabs did not accept the proposed procedure and its aim. On another level, this effort culminated in the merger of Mapai, Achdut Haavoda and Rafi in the new Israel Labor party.

Mapai's endeavor was almost defeated very shortly, as Eshkol's sudden death triggered a struggle for succession which threatened not only to split the new party but also to precipitate a policy showdown among the contenders. However, the threat was averted by the selection, in the person of Golda Meir, of a compromise candidate who, unlike Dayan, Allon and Pinchas Sapir (the other contenders) was known to be firm but uncommitted to any specific position. Moreover, Meir had the additional merit of being clearly a transient leader, by virtue of her age. The net effect was to confirm and solidify the principle of "keeping all options open" which was at the root of the unification.

The success of the effort to suspend decision on the basic postwar issues was confirmed in the general elections that took place in October, 1969. At a time when opinion in the country at large was fragmented, these turned out to be the least controversial of all elections in the country's history. Not only was the number of significant lists presented to the electorate smaller than ever, but the proposed programs were all couched in general terms with very few differences among them. Naturally, the returns were no more indicative of opinion in the country

than the platforms on which the people voted, but the results were nonetheless taken as a mandate for the continuation of the national government and the delay of decision.

The subsequent course of external events did nothing to alter the essential situation. Three potential pressures might have jointly or separately forced the Israeli political system to take basic decisions and incur divisions: an agreement on the part of one or more of the Arab states to a position acceptable to the "minimalists" in Israel; an agreement on the part of the big powers to such a formula; or overwhelming military pressure. However, no such pressures have developed to an extent sufficient to force a decision.

The American initiative of June 25, 1970, and its acceptance by the U.A.R. and the Soviet Union, appeared for a moment to be producing just that kind of pressure. Announced by Secretary of State William Rogers, it proposed a limited cease-fire and peace talks through U.N. Ambassador Gunnar Jarring. The Israeli government decided to go along with the United States proposal, and the Gachal party quit the national coalition in protest. However, the Israeli boycott of the peace explorations shortly after they began, because of alleged violations of the standstill cease-fire by the U.A.R., has eased the pressure for decision and the threat of division. Gachal is still out of the coalition, but it could take no serious exception to the position of the government since it withdrew from the peace talks; Gachal may, in fact, return to the coalition if the stalemate continues.

In effect, the continuing insulation of Israeli politics from external pressures allowed the Israeli political system to grapple with the impact of the 1967 crisis and war almost entirely in terms of internal politics. The principal internal political consideration that prevailed was the reluctance of critically placed party leaders to risk a competitive realignment of opinion on the newly arisen issues; instead, they preferred to preserve the formal alliance of all parties and to realign party structures to contain the fragmentation of opinion.

This resulted in a system that mobilized maximum capacity behind a negative stand (no withdrawal without peace; no peace without negotiation), but reduced to a minimum Israel's ability to build up substantive agreement and to maneuver freely in the diplomatic arena. This is why the national government of Israel has been unable to take any significant initiative and has not been able to respond effectively to foreign challenges and opportunities, except in the military sphere.

Mention of this exception suggests two additional important features of the system. Since the government and the parties as such failed to provide systematic leadership and guidance, the public, perplexed by the multiplicity of views and the complexity of issues, has tended naturally to look for individual leaders. So far, several leaders have been the focus of public attention, including Golda Meir, Ezer Weizman, Yigal Allon and, of course, Moshe Dayan. Should the situation take a critical turn, especially militarily, the chances are very great that a charismatic leader of Israel will emerge.

The other feature of the system is that since individual members of the government have definite substantive views on the issues raised by the war, those who are charged with defense, administration of occupied territories, foreign affairs, interior and others, are guided by these substantive views in the day-to-day management of affairs. And because defense requires day-to-day decisions of non-routine character most frequently, because defense decisions need to be made quickly, and because defense has a professional-technical character, the Defense Minister has had the greatest leeway to affect the general policy orientation by his administrative decisions. To mention just a few examples: it was Moshe Dayan who decreed the "open bridges policy" allowing movement back and forth between the two banks of the Jordan; it was he who initiated the policy of using Arab labor in Israel proper; it was he who experimented with "neighborhood punishments"; and it was he who authorized the bombing of targets deep in enemy territory.

As it now stands, the Israeli political system contains an element of instability because of the disparity between the actual substantive division of opinion in the country on the issues arising from the war, and the existing forms of political organization in the shape of the traditional parties and the national coalition government. This disparity has been controlled by the adoption of a formula that defines Israel's position in the procedural terms of insisting on negotiations aiming at peace. However, the retention of this formula has been possible only because there has been no strong external pressure on Israel to adopt or to accept a more specific position on postwar issues.

A change in the external conditions that have prevailed since 1967 could presumably come about either through a protracted intensification of the military pressure on Israel, or through an attempt by the big powers to impose a specific settlement.

The first of these possibilities does not seem to be very likely. Nothing in the relation of forces between the two sides or in the strategic and tactical options available to them portends any significant swing in the military capabilities of the Arab side in the next few years that would permit the Arabs to intensify pressure on Israel. Increased exertions along past lines or experimentation with new types of operations may, as in the past, hurt the Israelis for relatively short periods; but the probability is that, as in the past, the Israeli armed forces would eventually find ways to ease the pressure and to counter the new approaches.

The picture might change considerably if the Russians were to take a more active part in the Arab war effort, starting with the participation of Soviet pilots and air defense personnel in the air action. This, however, would change the entire configuration of the problem.

An agreement among the big powers is conceivable in the foreseeable future only on the basis of the withdrawal of Israel's forces from virtually all the occupied territories. This is a point on which the Soviets have insisted and which the United States has

already publicly conceded in the Rogers Plan. But the critical feature of any big power agreement from the point of view of its effect on Israel is whether such an agreement would aim at achieving a formal peace (involving a peace treaty or an equivalent contractual agreement) or whether it would envisage only an *ad hoc* type of settlement, as the Soviets have urged at their most accommodating moments. The two alternatives would have almost diametrically opposite effects on the Israeli political system.

An agreement among the big powers that aims at achieving firm peace presupposes the prior acquiescence of Egypt; otherwise it is almost impossible to visualize the Soviets agreeing to the plan. It must be supposed also that the plan would have adequate provisions for the security of the Arab and Israeli borders and for navigation, refugees and so on, as envisaged in the November, 1967, Security Council Resolution. The big powers would presumably support the agreement with positive measures, such as joint or separate security guarantees, arms control measures, and so on, and would press hard for its acceptance with every means short of the use of force. They might even condone the use of force by the Arab side and condemn Israeli responses in kind so long as Israel does not signify its acceptance of the plan.*

Under such circumstances, but *only* under such circumstances, there is no doubt that the proposal would quickly break up the national coalition government. Simultaneously, opinion in the country at large would be aroused and would line up for and against the plan. In short, an agreement among the big powers under the terms and the circumstances here envisaged would cause an upheaval in the Israeli political system leading to a complete redistribution of strength and a realignment of parties.

The actual outcome of the upheaval

would depend greatly on when the question is thrust upon Israel. Two years ago, for example, there was no doubt that a firm majority in favor of accepting a settlement would have emerged. Today, there is only a probability that such a majority would emerge. The sacrifices and losses that Israel has incurred in the fighting since 1968 have been so heavy that many who would have been content with peace without land revisions in 1968 now insist on changes to justify the sacrifices and casualties. At the same time, the fact that Israel has been able to hold the conquered territories for three years has induced many who had initially been prepared to accept peace without territorial modifications (because there was no practical alternative) to change their minds. Finally, the emergence of the Palestinian guerrillas as a political force has raised questions as to the viability of a peace agreement reached with the Arab states and has inclined some Israelis to look to a settlement with the Palestinians. Withal, the concrete prospect of peace with Egypt and Jordan and Lebanon, the desire to be accepted, to break out of the psychological confinement, to achieve normalcy in international relations, and to divert the energies invested in defense and warfare to other uses, contrasted with the alternatives, in case of resistance to the plan, of fighting alone, branded as an opponent of peace, incurring international sanctions, and losing much support even among world Jewry seem sufficient to secure a majority, albeit largely reluctant, in favor of acceptance.

Should the big powers attempt to force the plan on Israel at some relatively more remote date, say in another three years, the effect on the political system would probably be the same but the outcome of the upheaval would be much more difficult to predict. Whether in the immediate or in the more distant future, successful pressure on Israel on behalf of peace on the conditions indicated might open a very real prospect for a new and much more hopeful era in the history of the region.

An agreement among the big powers en-

* Note: The "American initiative" of June, 1970, did not meet these conditions. The main stress was on "stopping the shooting and starting to talk on the basis of the Security Council resolution," a loose formula that could, and was, variously interpreted by the parties concerned.

visaging an *ad hoc* type of settlement would presumably involve the same features we supposed in the case of a peace plan—minus, of course, a peace treaty or an equivalent contractual agreement. That is to say, it would presuppose the prior acquiescence of Egypt, would consist of a package including provisions for demilitarized zones, free navigation, refugee settlement and so on, and would either be “guaranteed” by the big powers or would have attached to it an American offer of a security guarantee for Israel. Here, too, the big powers would presumably press for its acceptance by every means short of force and might condone the use of force by the Arabs and condemn it by the Israelis.

THE EFFECT ON ISRAEL

The effect of such a plan on the Israeli political system would almost certainly be to transform its formal unity into substantive unity based on a common determination to resist it. There would be no question of any major party reformation. On the contrary, the parties would become consolidated from within and united among themselves as the hypothetical options now dividing them were eliminated.

The Israeli government has acted since 1967 on the assumption that it would not accept anything less than peace. For example, it has authorized the establishment of more than two dozen rural and urban settlements in occupied territories while denying that this betrayed an intention to annex the areas concerned, pointing out that nothing should preclude these settlements’ being in territory under Arab sovereignty in a situation of formal peace. Also, the government has encouraged an investment of hundreds of millions of dollars in a 42-inch oil pipeline from Elat to Ashdod and in tankers and tank farms to utilize it in the conviction that the whole project will be protected either by Israel’s armed forces or by an unequivocal contractual agreement with Egypt. Finally, the Israeli economy has been increasingly linked to the economy of the West Bank and the Gaza strip, particu-

larly through the employment of tens of thousands of Arab workers in Israel, on the grounds that such arrangements were compatible with future relations of peace. An *ad hoc* settlement has thus become virtually unacceptable for these practical reasons as well as for political, psychological and security reasons.

Israel’s physical capacity to resist has greatly increased since the beginning of 1968 and will become even greater in the few years ahead. Israel’s G.N.P. has grown by 25 per cent in the years 1968 and 1969 alone, and her defense allocations in these years have been at double the prewar rate. Of the nearly three billion dollars allocated to defense since the end of the war, a very considerable percentage—probably as much as half—has gone into investment in military industries designed to make Israel self-sufficient in all kinds of armaments. This program has already placed the country in a position of greatly reduced dependence on the outside and should approach its goal of self sufficiency in a few years at the present rate of development. At an accelerated rate, the time span might even be shortened.

The Israelis might also respond to the beginning of a pressure campaign for an *ad hoc* settlement by launching a contingency program, which they must surely have, to produce nuclear weapons. Then, depending on the unfolding of that campaign and the course of the military operations it would precipitate, they might either keep the possession of these weapons secret, or they might proclaim it in order to introduce the weapons as a deterrent. A less likely alternative, because of the Israelis’ confidence in their conventional warfare capacity and their military industries program, and their awareness of the complications that might ensue, is that the Israelis might produce the nuclear weapons and bring them into play as a deterrent as soon as they become available regardless of the course taken by the external pressures and military operations.

A continuation of the external situation that has prevailed since 1967—that is to say, a situation of relatively weak outside pressure

without direct involvement in military operations by any big power—would entail the continuation of the present system but on a more precarious basis. Contrary to the impressions conveyed by some observers, the process of adaptation of the Israeli political system over a long period of time has eliminated or checked basic sources of division that might have caused the system to crack under prolonged pressure of the kind it has been undergoing since 1967.

Concretely speaking, several related factors have often been cited as grounds for potential weakness in Israel's position in case of a prolonged continuation of the present situation. The curve of defense expenditures, it is pointed out, has reached the astounding level of 25 per cent of the G.N.P., has brought the absolute gap in the balance of payments well past the fabulous amount, for Israel, of one billion dollars a year, and has already nearly wiped out the country's foreign currency reserves. Such a rate of defense spending, it is argued, cannot be sustained for long, let alone continue on its upward curve, without the adoption of measures that would cripple the growth of the economy, impair its capacity to sustain future expenditures, and impose a very heavy strain on the people. This would in turn trigger social conflicts which might stimulate the latent communal (Oriental versus European Jews) problem and lead to grave intercommunal strife. Add the effect of the guerrilla action, urban terrorism, and civil disobedience on the part of the Palestinian Arabs, and the increasingly drastic countermeasures of the Israeli authorities, and a nightmarish garrison state might appear.

The distortions in this picture can be corrected fairly quickly. The very heavy rise in defense expenditure is, as we have said, associated in a large measure, amounting perhaps to half the total, with a program of investment in military industries. In 1970, when Israel must import most of her equipment while making the necessary investments, the burden is at or near its heaviest; but as the hardware begins to come through the new assembly lines, it should not only substitute

for the imports but provide a considerable output for export.

Other things being equal, this should ease the balance of payments problem and allow the rebuilding of the reserves. Moreover, the investment in military industries is already stimulating rather than crippling the growth of the economy and is having a considerable spillover effect on non-military industrial growth. The realization of a high rate of development from the present fairly high economic base by comparison with the economies of her opponents should allow Israel to spend larger and larger absolute amounts on defense in the future without having to do much tightening of belts. This does not mean that there would not be problems of inflation, balance of payments, income distribution and so on, but an Israel in which sharp socio-economic divisions no longer exist should be able to handle these problems better than she has in the past.

Chauvinism and repression as by-products of economic penury, social conflict, and intercommunal strife cannot be more likely than the products themselves. As for the consequences of the insurgency of the Palestinians and the counterinsurgency measures of the Israelis, these depend on the level of insurgency in the future. Should the guerrillas succeed in the years ahead in "polarizing" the Arab masses, establishing bases in the occupied territories, and launching waves of terror in urban centers, especially in Jewish cities and towns, a situation may well

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The Palestinian guerrillas "view their resistance movement as their only alternative to life and death in the refugee camps, since a faction-ridden Arab world cannot help them. . . ."

The Palestinian Resistance Movement

BY JOHN B. WOLF

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THE EMERGENCE of the Palestinian resistance movement as a significant factor in Middle East politics has been indicated by its recent display of militant opposition to the monarchy in Jordan. This display, which came within a flash of triggering military intervention by both the United States and Israel, has again focused attention on a chronic weakness of the Arabs—their inability to create viable national states. A viable national state must adopt programs that reflect a genuine consensus of all the nationalities situated within its borders. Lacking such programs, the state may find itself confronting dissident elements who have chosen armed violence as the sole alternative to disfranchisement, as the Palestinians did in September, 1970, in Jordan.¹

The conduct of a protracted internal war requires guerrillas who are well organized, equipped and trained, skillfully directed and highly motivated. Al Fatah, the largest of the Palestinian resistance groups, understands this fact.² Al Fatah has about 10,000 members. It is led by Yasir Arafat, who was a

teen-age gunrunner in the 1948 war with Israel and a past president of the Palestine Student Federation at Cairo University, where he majored in civil engineering. Al Fatah members declare that they will persist in their struggle to regain Palestine regardless of the damage that may be inflicted by Israeli retaliatory raids against their bases in host countries of the Arab world, and regardless of the unwillingness of Arab states to pursue exclusive Palestinian interests when Israeli power can be used against them.³ These declarations hinder rather than aid the cause of Palestinian resistance, because they create frustrations which eventually explode in the kind of violence that flared recently in Jordan, where many guerrilla cadres and portions of the resistance movement's infrastructure were obliterated by the Jordanian army. Other recent examples of the kind of violence that breaks out when national groups are stifled by states who consider their exclusive interests anathema are Iraq's difficulties with the Kurds, the civil war in Yemen, armed clashes between Muslims and Christians in the southern provinces of the Sudan and the overthrow of the Libyan monarchy.

Extreme individualism is a characteristic not unique to the Arabs. Yet Ibn Khaldun, a fourteenth century Arab historical philosopher, mentions that "every Arab considers himself worthy to rule and it is rare to find one of them submitting to another, be it his father, or brother, or the head of the clan." Khaldun viewed individualism in the Arab

¹ United Nations Commission on Human Rights, *Definition and Classification of Minorities* (Lake Success, New York: United Nations Publications, 1950), pp. 1-12.

² George K. Tanham, *Communist Revolutionary Warfare* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), pp. 9-47. Also important for the student of guerrilla warfare is Samuel B. Griffith, *Mao Tse-Tung On Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 41-114.

³ Excellent coverage of Yasir Arafat and Fatah appears in "The Guerrilla Threat in the Middle East," *Time*, December 13, 1968, pp. 29-36.

world as the cause of disorder, and he saw disorder as leading to anarchy.⁴ In conformity with Khaldun's thesis, the Palestinian resistance movement can be seen as an expression of Arab nationalism on the part of a particular group of Arabs who are involved in military operations against a formidable foe regardless of the possible consequences to themselves or to the collective membership of the Arab world. Meanwhile, Israel consistently denies that the Palestinian resistance movement is a real threat, and some United States observers believe that the guerrillas are ineffectual against Israeli counter-measures. Often infiltrator teams of ten men leave nine members of their team dead inside Israel.⁵ However, Yasir Arafat warned of this terrible cost in lives when he described the road to win back Palestine as being marked by death and sacrifice. This death wish: the wish to kill, the wish to be killed, and the wish to die, is alluded to by T. E. Lawrence in his book *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom*. Lawrence goes on to remark that the Arabs "are a people of starts, for whom the abstract was the strongest motive, the process of infinite courage and variety, and the end nothing. They were as unstable as water, and like water would perhaps finally prevail."⁶

Committed to the liberation of their homeland, the Palestinians must either persist in their struggle against Israel or lose their identity as a national group. They were displaced from their homeland in 1948 when Israel was established; in 1967, they were forced to flee from the west bank of the

Jordan River when it was occupied by the Israeli army. Thus the Palestinians found sanctuary in Jordan. However, because they are neither emotionally, intellectually nor ideologically attached to monarchical rule, and because they are more sophisticated than King Hussein's bedouin supporters, the Palestinians ignored the King's program and conspired to end his rule by seizing power for themselves. Yet every attempt they made to depose the King, including the civil war of September, 1970, was crushed by the monarchy and its supporters.

Exacerbating their plight is the problem of resettlement, which seems insoluble. The Arabs insist that the absorption of the Palestinians into adjacent lands would imply Arab approval of continued Israeli retention of refugee property and would thereby indicate a tacit Arab recognition of Israel. The Palestinians are thus denied the opportunity to settle permanently anywhere in the Arab world except in Jordan, whose government they disdain. Consequently, they view their resistance movement as their only alternative to life and death in the refugee camps, since a faction-ridden Arab world cannot help them, as has been demonstrated in three wars against Israel.⁷

ORIGINS OF VIOLENCE

Arab terrorism waged by Palestinians against Israel is not a new factor in Middle East politics. Violent encounters between opposing paramilitary organizations that draw their members from Arab and Jewish settlers have been continuous in Palestine since the establishment of the British mandate and the subsequent heavy influx of Jewish immigrants. In 1925, Haganah (Defense) was formally established by the Jewish community, organized as a static force composed of rural and urban elements that could be mobilized on short notice. Its purpose was to counter Arab terrorists who tried to create an atmosphere of tension that would dissuade Jewish immigrants.

Unable to halt the rising tide of immigration after 1933, the Arabs tried to unite their organizations for combined operations.

⁴ Iban Khaldun, *The Muquaddimah—An Introduction to History*, trans. by Franz Rosenthal (New York: Bollingen, 1958). The entire book must be read for complete understanding of the causes of disorder.

⁵ David Reed, "The Fedayeen—Israel's Fanatic Foe," *Reader's Digest*, October, 1970, p. 169.

⁶ T. E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars Of Wisdom—A Triumph* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1935), pp. 42-43.

⁷ John B. Wolf, "The Arab Refugee Problem," *Current History*, December, 1967, pp. 352-358 and James A. Michener, "What to Do About The Palestinian Refugees?" *The New York Times Magazine*, September 27, 1970, pp. 23-25 and pp. 114-130.

Haj Amin Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Palestine, directed a coordinated program of Arab resistance that was successful in a series of sharp attacks on Jewish settlements. But after a short time the Mufti's organization, riddled with dissension among various factions, splintered into a number of smaller and less effective groups. However, the leaders of the Arab resistance movements continued to try to build an effective armed clandestine organization among the Arabs of Palestine.⁸ Their methods included selective terrorism, intimidation, and assassination of those of their fellows who were not sympathetic to their cause, indicating their understanding of the axiom that "it is not at all necessary to have the sympathy of a majority of the people in order to rule them 'since' the right organization can turn the trick."⁹ Terrorism was used as an effective way to gain support, if not sympathy; by its selective application, the Arab resistance movement was able to obtain funds and manpower from Arab villages.

In April, 1936, the Arabs of Palestine revolted against British rule. Initially, this uprising seemed to contain all the elements required for a sustained popular revolution, but efforts by an Arab Higher Committee to coordinate the activities of the various independent guerrilla bands were again futile. John Marlowe describes the 1936 Arab revolt as a peasant revolution which, like the Arab revolt of 1916, was "one of the blind alleys of Arab nationalism doomed, like the desert revolt, to failure, and destined, unlike the desert revolt, to oblivion, for lack of a Lawrence to immortalize it."¹⁰ A British commission which went to Palestine to investigate the causes of the 1936 violence con-

cluded that it was caused by "the desire of the Arabs for national independence and their hatred and fear of the Jewish National Home." Furthermore, the commission viewed the mandate in its existing form as unworkable and recommended partition as the only solution.

Rejecting the partition scheme, the Arabs resumed their campaign of violence and forced the British to commit a counterinsurgency force of 20,000 troops. Even so, the Arab rebellion did not end until the British government issued the White Paper of 1939, putting a stop to further extension of Jewish land purchase, and eventually to all Jewish immigration. On the outbreak of World War II in 1939, a Jewish struggle against the White Paper policy was called off in favor of a united front against the common enemy, Germany, and both Jewish and Arab volunteers served with the British Army.¹¹

PALESTINIANS EXILED

During the Arab-Israeli confrontation of 1948, dissension among the Arabs again prevented the development of a united front and a coordinated program of resistance. From its base in Gaza, a Palestine Arab Higher Committee formed in September, 1948, claimed authority over the whole of Palestine and struggled with Jordan's King Abdullah for political control of the Arab community of Palestine. Emerging as the winner in this bitter power struggle, King Abdullah proclaimed himself King of Arab Palestine and negotiated a local truce on the Jerusalem front. In 1950, the Arab-occupied portion of Palestine west of the Jordan River was annexed by Jordan, and shortly thereafter King Abdullah's authority was challenged by a "National Front" organized by the Palestinians. Through this front, they attacked all aspects of his policy. It soon became obvious that King Abdullah's annexation of Arab Palestine had condemned Jordan to political instability and economic stagnation.

Between 1948 and 1955, a number of unofficial and unorganized encounters occurred between bands of Palestinians and the Israelis. As these incidents increased both in gravity

⁸ Europa Publications Limited, *The Middle East and North Africa* 1964-65 (London: Europa Publications, 1964), pp. 253-254.

⁹ Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare—A French View of Counterinsurgency* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 4. On the use of terror by guerrillas to build an armed clandestine organization see Chapter 2 in Sir Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1970).

¹⁰ John Marlowe, *The Seat of Pilate* (London: Cresset Press, 1959), pp. 137-138.

¹¹ Christopher Sykes, *Crossroads To Israel* (New York: World Publishing Co., 1965), pp. 153-200.

and in numbers, the Israeli government adopted a policy of armed retaliation. In the summer of 1955, Israeli forces launched a large-scale raid on the Gaza Strip, where Arab guerrillas were based and hidden among the 200,000 Palestinian refugees who were then living there in camps. Thirty-eight Arabs were killed and 31 were injured by the attackers. As a consequence of this incident, Egypt began to train and equip armed groups of Palestinians called "fedayeen" (the name means "they who sacrifice themselves") for purposes of conducting deep penetration raids into Israeli territory. Thus began a cycle of fedayeen raids and Israeli retaliations that led to the Sinai War of October, 1956.¹²

From the end of the 1956 war until early 1965, only sporadic and low intensity clashes occurred between Israelis and Palestinians. The Palestinians were preoccupied in Jordan, where they tried to besmirch the pro-Western policies of Jordan's King Hussein, who was crowned in 1953 after reaching his majority at 18. Adamantly refusing to capitulate to their demands, the King used his bedouin troops to maintain order and to crush repeated attempts by the Palestinians to seize his kingdom.

A new hope for the eventual realization of Palestinian national aspirations was born as a consequence of the first Arab Summit Conference held in January, 1964. At this conference, Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser took the position that the Arab states were not prepared to fight Israel immediately and had to prepare by organizing a United Arab Command and an armed organization of Palestine Arab refugees. Later that same year, at the second Arab Summit Conference, Arab delegates authorized the formation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.). Commencing operations against

Israel from bases in the Gaza Strip, the P.L.O. depended upon Egypt for support, whereas another and rival resistance group called Fatah* emerged in 1965 and operated across the less easily defended Israeli-Jordanian frontier. Once in full-scale operation, these organizations averaged about three raids a month each against Israel. In the fall of 1966, Fatah was conducting operations in the Jerusalem area.¹³ In October, 1967, the Israelis retaliated by unleashing a large-scale attack against the "West Bank" village of Es Samu where they dynamited 46 empty houses and reduced the local mosque to rubble with tank fire.¹⁴

Respectful of Israel's military power, King Hussein reacted to the Es Samu raid by issuing regulations that banned the training of resistance fighters in his country and forbade the use of his territory as a base for guerrilla operations. These regulations incensed the Palestinians, who once again challenged the King's authority. During the Six Day War of 1967, King Hussein's bedouin army fought courageously against the Israelis and recouped for their King a measure of his lost prestige. At the same time, the P.L.O., inadequately trained and armed, was easily overrun by Israel and was almost completely discredited.

ORGANIZATION AND STRATEGY

As a consequence of their poor showing in the 1967 Arab-Israeli confrontation, the Palestinians searched for new leadership and new programs. Fatah expanded its ranks, and immediately after the cease-fire it tried to build a clandestine organization among the Arabs of the occupied West Bank. Its plans, however, were shattered when the Israeli army detected and seized most of its cadres and demolished the dwellings of their sympathizers. A new group called the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine then evolved from the Arab Nationalist Movement, founded by George Habash after the 1948 War for the purpose of recovering Palestine. But Fatah remained the most effective and popular of the resistance organizations, and in February, 1969, at the fourth Palestine National Assembly in Cairo, it was given 4

¹² Fred J. Khouri, "The Policy of Retaliation in Arab-Israeli Relations," *The Middle East Journal*, Autumn, 1966, pp. 438-442.

* Fatah is derived from the Arabic words *Harakat al Tahrir al-Falastin* which means Movement for the Liberation of Palestine. Its initials form the Arabic word for death.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 448-449.

¹⁴ "Incident at Samu," *Time*, November 25, 1966, p. 37.

seats on the 11-man executive committee organized to coordinate Palestinian resistance. At the conference, Fatah's commander, Yasir Arafat, was elected chairman of the executive committee.

In April, 1969, a Palestinian Armed Struggle Command was organized to coordinate the military activities of the various guerrilla organizations. This command is a military directorate with loosely defined powers whose effectiveness is lessened by the refusal of Habash's Popular Front to participate in its operations. Consequently, ideological and tactical disputes continue to impede the progress of the Palestinian resistance movement. Fatah emphasizes organization, discipline and individual competence. With the P.L.O., it works solely for the liberation of Palestine and refuses to be identified with either the socialist or the conservative element in the Arab world. The Popular Front, however, wants to create revolutionary socialist democracies in all the Arab countries. Still another group, calling itself the Popular Democratic Front (P.D.F.), advocates a Marxist-style world revolution. Tactically, both Fatah and the P.L.O. emphasize solid organization and a protracted struggle against Israel, whereas the Popular Front tries to develop a movement in the occupied areas and specializes in terrorism outside the Middle East, such as airliner "skyjacking." The P.D.F. opposes "skyjacking," but seeks to execute spectacular acts of terrorism against Israeli citizens.¹⁵

Since the 1967 war, mass sympathy for the cause of Palestine liberation among the Arabs has enabled all the resistance organizations to upgrade their recruiting activities and to influence the formation of national policy in states bordering Israel. Although once reluctant to aid the guerrillas for fear of Israeli retaliation, the governments of Leb-

anon and Jordan are now under increasing pressure to support their operations fully. Acting in retaliation for an attack on an El Al airliner in Athens by Lebanese-based guerrillas and the "skyjacking" of another Israeli airliner over Italy by the same group in July, 1968, helicopter-borne Israelis destroyed 13 Arab civil airliners at Beirut International Airport in December, 1968.

Immediately after this attack, Lebanon tried to bar guerrilla operations from her soil. Continued operations by Fatah and the P.L.O. against Israel from bases in South Lebanon caused the Lebanese army to move against the guerrillas. These countermeasures, however, plunged Lebanon's delicately balanced Christian-Muslim society into a state bordering on schizophrenia. Currently, Lebanon's government treads a steadily narrowing path between the prospect of explosive Muslim street demonstrations on the one hand, and Israeli reprisal raids on the other.¹⁶

In Jordan, the guerrillas are a real and omnipresent threat to the monarchy, for public admiration has raised them into a potentially powerful opposition force to King Hussein. A new military conscription law, instituted by the Jordanian government in 1969, abolished certain draft exempt categories in a time of national emergency and inspired charges that King Hussein was trying to foil guerrilla recruitment drives by putting all their potential candidates in his army. Also in 1969, armed and uniformed resistance members appeared publicly in Jordan's main cities, and frictions increased between them and the army. The King seemed unable to stop the guerrillas from using bases in Jordan as points of departure for their attacks against Israel.

GUERRILLA STRATEGY

By choosing guerrilla war as the means to obtain the goals defined in their motto: "National Unity, National Mobilization, and Liberation," the Palestinians are admitting that their struggle will be both protracted and bloody.¹⁷ However, they gain some immediate satisfaction by concentrating on in-

¹⁵ Michael Hudson, "The Palestinian Arab Resistance Movement: Its Significance In The Middle East Crisis," *The Middle East Journal*, Summer, 1969, pp. 298-300.

¹⁶ John B. Wolf, "Shadow On Lebanon," *Current History*, January, 1970, pp. 24-26.

¹⁷ Saadat Hasan, *The Palestine Liberation Organization* (New York: The Palestine Liberation Organization, 1967), Appendix 1, The Palestinian National Covenant, Article 10.

intermediate strategic objectives of an economic and political nature which they view as stepping stones along the path to final victory. Economically, the movement tries to curtail foreign investment in Israel and to discourage tourism by executing and publicizing a program of "skyjacking," bombings of selected targets in areas of tourist interest, and guerrilla assaults. Politically, the guerrillas try to convince the United States and the Soviet Union either to use their good offices to alter the Middle East situation in favor of the Palestinians by limiting the sale of strategic arms to Israel or by forcing Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories, or to face the possibility of seeing themselves aligned inadvertently with opposing elements in a Middle East showdown that could escalate into nuclear war.¹⁸

Militarily, the Palestinians try to force the Israelis to forego flexibility by maintaining reaction forces at many widely separated locations along the cease-fire lines which force Israel to reduce her firepower on the Suez front and limit her ability to mass her forces rapidly elsewhere. Israel's vulnerability to a sustained war waged simultaneously on many fronts was clear for the first time during the recent civil war in Jordan when Israel was prepared to use her armor against Syrian tank forces in Northern Jordan only if the United States agreed to safeguard her rear flanks from Egyptian or Soviet attacks from the Suez Canal area.¹⁹

The Palestinians have realized only marginal success in their efforts to attain their intermediate goals. Israel regards programs such as Nahal (a Hebrew acronym for Fighting Pioneering Youth [*Noar Halutz Lochaim*]) adequate to handle the guerrilla threat. Nahal is a program that combines military service and specialized agricultural training as a substitute for compulsory ser-

vice in regular military units and provides highly motivated groups of young people for the establishment of settlements in strategic or dangerously exposed locations.²⁰

JORDANIAN CIVIL WAR

Against Jordan, however, the Palestinians appeared to be increasingly pugnacious, and as the late summer of 1970 arrived they were once again openly haranguing King Hussein. On the one hand, the Palestinians demanded that the Jordanian army mobilize for an attack on Israel; on the other hand, they knew that King Hussein did not want his army mauled by Israel because it would then be unable to crush an internal revolt. Although anxious to depose the King, the Palestinians were checked by the obvious fact that any real and imminent threat to end his rule would probably trigger an Israeli move to bolster him and might possibly involve the United States Sixth Fleet in support of Israel if its support were requested. The guerrillas were dismayed by the favorable reaction of Egypt and Jordan to the Middle East Peace Plan, formulated by the United States, which the Palestinians could not accept because it assured Israel of about 80 per cent of their homeland. Therefore, in September, 1970, after King Hussein ousted a pro-Palestinian civilian government and installed a military regime composed of his own supporters, the guerrillas revolted against the King.

Immediately, King Hussein realized that he had to abdicate or fight. Choosing to fight, the King and his army inflicted heavy punishment on the guerrillas and their Syrian supporters, who tried to carve out a redoubt in northern Jordan. The revolt lasted seven days. But by September 25, it was clear that

(Continued on page 49)

¹⁸ Y. Harkabi, *Fedayeen Action and Arab Strategy* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, December, 1958).

¹⁹ Benjamin Welles, "U.S.-Israeli Military Action On Jordan Was Envisioned," *The New York Times*, October 8, 1970, p. 1.

²⁰ Irving Heymons, "The Israeli NAHAL Program," *The Middle East Journal*, Summer, 1967, pp. 314-324.

John B. Wolf is a specialist in international relations and has written a number of published accounts of the role of national minorities in domestic and world politics. He was recently awarded a City University of New York research grant to complete a study of Sino-Soviet relations in Central Asia.

"Perhaps the main root of Arab radicalism," writes this specialist, "can be traced to the general underdevelopment of the region." Nonetheless, as he points out, "The role of Israel as the accelerator and intensifier of Arab radicalism was obvious in the timing and thrust of revolutions such as those in the Sudan and Libya and in the anti-royalist rebellion staged by the Palestinian fedayeen in Jordan in September, 1970."

Arab Radicalism: Problems and Prospects

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BETWEEN 1967 AND 1970 the Arab East supplied the news media with more sensational headlines than any other part of the world. Much of the news has pertained to revolutionary changes and twists in the Arab political processes. Old political structures have suffered total or partial defeats and new ones have emerged in their place. Revolutionary rhetoric has intensified and has often been accompanied by radical legislation and policies. In certain countries, denunciation of the evil and corrupt past and present and of the internal and external enemies of the revolution has reached a high pitch, and has sometimes been followed by harsh reprisals. All of this has been taking place in the midst of the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict against the background of the Big Power rivalry for influence in the Middle East as a whole. As the new decade of the 1970's begins to unfold, it is perhaps proper to ask some basic questions as to the meaning, direction, causes and prospects of Arab radicalism.

In terms of pragmatic contemporary politics, Arab radicalism can be traced to two revolutionary currents: that personified in the late President Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egyptian revolution and the other identified with the ideology and action of the Arab Socialist Renaissance (Baath) party. Nasser's revolution dates back to 1952-1953. The

Baath began making a serious impact on Syrian and Iraqi politics in 1957-1958. The Syro-Egyptian union and the Iraqi revolution, both occurring in 1958, were expressions of a dynamic forward surge of Arab radicalism. They constituted two major events in the early stages of the Arab cold war which extended over a decade (1957-1967) and which divided the Arab world, rather symmetrically, into two opposing camps, the radical and the conservative. Each camp numbered five states: the radical embracing the United Arab Republic, Syria, Iraq, Algeria and Yemen; the conservative comprising the monarchies of Saudi Arabia, Libya, Jordan, Kuwait and Morocco. A third, uncommitted but moderate force numbered Lebanon, Tunisia and the Sudan as its members. The cold war abounded in crises which threatened its conversion into a hot war: repeated attempts to overthrow the Jordanian monarchy (1957-1958), the civil war and intervention in Lebanon (1958), the threatened Iraqi conquest of Kuwait (1961), and the U.A.R. armed intervention in the Yemen civil war (1962-1967). Despite these crises, a precarious balance was maintained between radicalism and conservatism. The decade of the Arab cold war was a period of relative tranquility in Arab-Israeli relations. These relations, true enough, were disturbed by the Jordan waters crisis of 1963-1964, but the

disturbance had more of a potential than an immediate impact.

The June War of 1967 upset the symmetrical balance of the Arab cold war dichotomy. In the first place, the cold war came to an end officially with the convocation of the Khartoum summit meeting (September 1, 1967), and the resulting pledges of subsidy to be paid to revolutionary Egypt by the oil-rich monarchies of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya. In the second place, the Kingdom of Jordan and the "populist" U.A.R.—hitherto sworn enemies—shared the common fate of defeat and territorial losses and found themselves cooperating in the diplomatic and military sectors. Furthermore, the presence of Syrian and Iraqi troops on Jordan's Israeli front seemed to attenuate, however temporarily, the fundamental animosity of the two revolutionary republics toward royalist Jordan.

FORCES FOR RADICALISM

But the June War had an additional and more profound impact: it released new forces which greatly intensified the trend toward radicalism in the Arab world. This trend expressed itself in the following five ways:

(a) *Overthrow of moderate political structures.* On May 25, 1969, Sudan's parliamentary government was overthrown in a military coup led by Colonel Gaafar al-Nimeiry. The new regime, whose structure and mechanics were similar to the Egyptian prototype, promptly proclaimed its adherence to the principles of Arab socialism and unity, denounced Zionism and imperialism, and asserted its solidarity with the U.A.R. and other revolutionary Arab centers. Three months later, on September 1, Libya's King Idris was overthrown by a military junta headed by Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi. The Revolutionary Command Council, composed of officers whose average age was about 27, followed Sudan's example almost to the letter by proclaiming virtually identical slogans of freedom, socialism and unity and declaring its close solidarity with Cairo. Between the Sudanese and the Libyan revolutions, an abortive attempt at the overthrow

of the monarchy was made by elements of the air force in Saudi Arabia.

(b) *Intensification of radical measures in the already established revolutionary regimes.* This was especially true of Syria and Iraq. Since the 1960's (Syria, 1963; Iraq, 1968), the two countries have been under the rule of the rival branches of the Baath party, each exercising dictatorial control in alliance with the army. The extreme left wing of the Baath in Syria gained power through a violent "palace coup" as early as February, 1966, and promptly set out to purge the party of its right-wing enemies, forcing most of them to flee the country. The developments of 1967, by providing a renewed focus on foreign enemies—Israel and imperialism—strengthened the hand of the extreme group in power. Its domestic policies became politically more oppressive and economically more restrictive and anti-bourgeois.

Notwithstanding the fact that Iraq was ruled by a local Baath organization hostile to the one in Syria, her policies took a similar turn toward greater radicalism. This found its expression primarily in the terror applied in 1969–1970 to the regime's opponents. Highly respected public figures of Iraq, including some considered as the "founding fathers" of the revolution of 1958 (such as Generals Rashed Musleh and Abdul Aziz Oqeili), were jailed, denounced as C.I.A. and Zionist agents, forced to confess publicly, and sentenced to death, along with certain Jews accused of espionage for the benefit of Israel. The regime went even so far as to attack the overthrown President, General Abdul Rahman Arif—in exile in London—as an imperialist stooge and traitor. Such limited opportunities of dissent as hitherto existed in Iraq were extinguished and an increasing number of Iraqi intelligentsia fearful of the regime's intolerance sought refuge and an opportunity to earn a living abroad.

(c) *Campaign for union of revolutionary states.* Intensification of domestic radicalism was accompanied by stepped-up activity to assure the unity of all revolutionary forces in the Arab world, with special emphasis on the union of states which had undergone a revolu-

tion. The last serious attempt to effect such a union had been made in 1963 during the talks held in Cairo among Iraq (then under temporary Baath rule), Syria, and the U.A.R. The attempt ended in failure. Seven years later, the center of gravity shifted to the northeastern area of Africa: on December 27, 1969, the U.A.R., Libya and the Sudan issued the Tripoli Declaration proclaiming the conclusion of a Tripartite Alliance. They followed it by reaching, on November 8, 1970, an agreement to establish a federation in stages. To lay the groundwork, they formed five joint bodies necessary for the achievement of their goal. Of these, the Political Command composed of the heads of state of the three countries was to be the highest organ. No deadline for the final establishment of the federation was set. However, officially inspired commentaries strongly emphasized the similarity of the revolutionary and nationalist objectives of the three countries in question as well as their respective contributions to the strength of the projected federation: Egypt's manpower (33 million), Sudan's agricultural resources, and Libya's oil. Characteristically, the official communiqué declared:

The Arab nation now faces an attempt aimed at encircling it and at freezing the Arab revolutionary tide by taking advantage of the collusion between international imperialism and international Zionism. . . . The three leaders, while presenting to the Arab peoples and nation their agreement to work for setting up a federation, would hope, and have confidence, that their nation would accept and bless the step on the grounds that it is one step forward, a big indication of the reality of the united Arab destiny and a banner that constantly rises higher among the banners that had been raised by Gamal Abdel Nasser.¹

(d) *Growth of the Palestinian revolutionary movement.* For nearly two decades, the dispossessed Palestinian Arabs, frustrated and resentful, led a rather passive existence in the makeshift refugee camps ringing the territory of Israel. But

following the June War, the incipient guerilla movement surfaced in the form of a number of militant organizations, of which the *Fatah* (formally established in 1965) became the largest under the leadership of Yasir Arafat. *Fatah*, followed by other groups, rejected the U.N. resolution of November 22, 1967, which called for withdrawal of Israel from occupied territories; instead it demanded the liberation of the whole of Palestine and the replacement of the Jewish state of Israel by a democratic state of Palestine which would assure equality to Muslims, Jews and Christians. While in terms of an Arab-Israeli solution, this appeared to be a radical program, *Fatah* abstained from any ideological commitment and, in social terms, could be considered as a neutral organization. The same could not be said of certain groups standing to the left of *Fatah*, particularly the Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine (P.F.L.P.), headed by George Habash, and the Palestine Democratic Front (P.D.F.), led by Nayef Hawatmeh. Both openly proclaimed themselves Marxist-Leninist, the P.D.F. leaning toward Maoism, and both aimed not only at the liberation of Palestine from Jewish control but also at the revolutionary transformation of the Arab world as a whole. Their immediate target was the pro-Western royalist regime in Jordan which they viewed as a major obstacle to the achievement of the *fedayeen* (guerrilla) objectives. Lebanon's bourgeois democratic government, Western-oriented and fearful of possible Israeli reprisals, was also viewed as a nuisance and as a virtual enemy to be disposed of if necessary. All *fedayeen* groups, together with the formal body, the Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.), angrily rejected the acceptance of the American peace and cease-fire proposals of June 19, 1970, by Nasser and King Hussein of Jordan as incompatible with the aims of the Palestinian revolution. Among the established governments, they found endorsement of their stand by Syria, Iraq and Algeria, all three outbidding each other in revolutionary fervor.

With the passage of time, the *fedayeen*

¹ On November 27, 1970, under its new regime headed by General Hafez Assad, Syria was admitted to the U.A.R.-Libyan-Sudanese alliance with the aim of joining the projected federation.

movement itself tended to undergo the process of radicalization. The struggle for liberation was extended beyond the Israeli-held territories to far-away places such as London, Zurich and Athens; it was also broadened to embrace not only Israeli persons and property as targets of attack but also the interests of all those foreign countries (foremost among them the United States) which were branded as allies of Israel. This enlarged struggle expressed itself in spectacular bombings, hijackings of passenger airplanes, and detention of hostages.

(e) *A revolutionary foreign policy.* The last but not least aspect of radicalism was to be found in the shift in the foreign policies of the revolutionary states. Upon its advent to power, every radical regime invariably proclaimed a policy based on coexistence, non-alignment, anti-imperialism, and solidarity with the Third World. Yet this policy tended to veer, gradually or abruptly, depending on the circumstances, toward closer identification with the "socialist camp" (a euphemism for the Communist bloc) and progressive alienation from the United States. In this process, United States interests in the area suffered gradual erosion, punctuated by such events as the removal of the Wheelus Air Base from Libya, the sequestration of American schools and universities, denial of overflight rights, oil embargoes and, above all, severance of diplomatic relations.

ROOTS OF ARAB RADICALISM

Perhaps the main root of Arab radicalism can be traced to the general underdevelopment of the region. More precisely, the awakened consciousness of this retardation has acted as the main stimulant to radicalism. Development of such consciousness was inevitable in an age of multiplying communications and mass media and the growing exposure of the Arab intelligentsia and masses to the technology and progress of the West.

Had the existing political structures been more responsive to the needs and aspirations of the peoples, the process of awakening might have resulted in a relatively crisis-free evolution, avoiding abrupt changes and vio-

lence. The neighboring Muslim states of Turkey and Iran, each in its own way, have set an example that indicated the possibility of an evolutionary process. But this was patently not the case in the Arab world. With a few exceptions, the traditional political structures failed to cope adequately with the demands for modernization. The most common failure was the inability to satisfy the rising expectations of the intelligentsia.

The legacy of imperialism added another aggravating dimension to the process of radicalization. In fact, it was not imperialism per se which was at stake. France had been forced out of the Arab East by 1945 and, under French President Charles de Gaulle, had decided to relinquish her remaining foothold in Algeria by 1962. Britain renounced formal control over most of her Arab client states by 1954, put an end to her colonial dominance of the South Arabian Federation in 1968, and announced an impending withdrawal from the Persian Gulf principalities by 1971. However, the Franco-British Suez adventure in 1956, mounted in collusion with Israel, undid much of the good will that Britain's gradual withdrawal might have generated. There were also certain economic strongholds, maintained on a commercial basis long after the relinquishment of British political controls, which fed the discontent of the tense local nationalists regardless of the benefits these enterprises might yield to the host Arab states.

Nor could the Communist influence be disregarded as a factor in building up radical attitudes. The revolutionary example of the mighty Soviet state and of Communist China and the absorption of Communist ideology, partly or totally, by certain alienated groups in the Arab world were significant factors. Except for the clearly indoctrinated Communists, the radically inclined Arab intelligentsia did not accept Soviet and Chinese patterns uncritically; in fact, it saw serious flaws. Two features of these systems, however, made an impression on reform-oriented Arabs: the ability of a small but well organized group of men to seize power and effect major socio-economic changes; and the use

of planning under state auspices to assure rapid development and industrialization. In short, the gist of the Soviet-Chinese message was that a small group could modernize a society with appropriate use of coercion, disregarding the opposition of both the vested private interests and the apathetic and ignorant masses.

But in terms of contemporary realities, the question of Israel overshadowed all the preceding causes as a stimulant of radicalism. The very enumeration of these causes makes it obvious that Arab radicalism would have developed even if there had been no Israeli state in the area. However, Israel acted as the most powerful catalyst for those other factors and as their dynamic accelerator. Furthermore, Israel's importance could not be ascribed to the fact that a progressive Israeli nation was developing its country within the framework of democratic institutions, but primarily to the fact that Israel had inflicted humiliation and defeat upon the Arabs in three successive encounters since 1948, foremost of which was the June War of 1967. Arab opinion showed a remarkable unanimity in seeing Israel not only as a direct enemy but also as a tool of unrepentant Western imperialism.

Thus it was not too difficult for the radicals to forge a suggestive syndrome linking capitalism causally with imperialism and Zionism. Capitalism was suspect, and this suspicion applied to both the foreign and the native capitalists to whom the label of reactionary or feudal was being attached with increasing frequency. The ease with which the indicted enemies of the regime in Iraq were tarred indiscriminately with the same brush as spies, reactionaries, agents of foreign monopolies, and tools of imperialism and Zionism in 1969 provided an eloquent demonstration of this syndrome in practice.

The role of Israel as the accelerator and intensifier of Arab radicalism was obvious in the timing and thrust of revolutions such as those in the Sudan and Libya and in the anti-royalist rebellion staged by the Palestinian fedayeen in Jordan in September, 1970. None of these developments was self-contained:

each was producing reverberations far beyond its own locale in the Arab world as a whole.

SETBACKS FOR RADICALISM

In spite of powerful stimulants, Arab radicalism has encountered serious obstacles in its forward march. These became particularly evident in the second half of 1970. In mid-summer, U.A.R. President Nasser decided to accept the peace proposals formulated on June 19 by Secretary of State Rogers to bring about a cease-fire and the resumption of Arab-Israeli peace talks under U.N. auspices. In spite of strong fedayeen criticism, Nasser persevered in his decision and backed it up by a show of firmness in closing Fatah's broadcasting facilities in Cairo. Similar resolution was displayed in rebuking the attacks which the insecure Baath regime in Iraq launched against him. In a speech full of devastating sarcasm, Nasser ridiculed Iraq's bellicose stance, asking why Iraqi troops had been inactive whenever the Israelis attacked the eastern front or the Egyptian and Jordanian troops were engaged in battle. In accepting the Rogers initiative, Nasser ranged himself on the side of Jordan's King Hussein, overlooking ideological differences and opting for moderation. By the same token, when Hussein's survival was at stake in the subsequent (September) civil war in Jordan, Nasser refused to identify himself with the fedayeen. Instead, he assumed the role of a peacemaker in an effort which placed such heavy demands on his physical and mental energy that it led to his sudden death in September, 1970.

While it is too early at this stage to predict the course Nasser's successors will ultimately follow, the immediate post-Nasser policy in Egypt under President Anwar el-Sadat was one of assuring the continuity of the departed leader's moderate stance in the last months of his life. This trend was personified by the appointment as Premier of Mahmoud Fawzi, a 70-year-old diplomat and a civilian whose career spanned the royalist, revolutionary and post-Nasser eras in Egypt's contemporary history. The U.A.R.'s new government not only accepted the extension of the expired

90-day cease-fire but also strongly urged the resumption of peace talks which had been interrupted since mid-September. Clearly, the U.A.R. was prepared to settle for less than the maximalist program advocated by the fedayeen and by the vocal but ineffective militant leaders of Iraq and Syria.

Unwillingness to appease the fedayeen was also characteristic of Jordan's policy. For Jordan, the issue was not merely to determine which policy to follow vis-à-vis Israel but first and foremost to determine whether the Jordanian government would remain sovereign in its territory in defiance of the fedayeen bid for uncontrolled power and immunity from the jurisdiction of official authorities. Deciding that a state-within-state situation could no longer be tolerated, in September King Hussein and his army struck a blow at the fedayeen when the latter—with Syria's help—openly defied him. The King's victory was achieved at a high cost, but in the end his position was strengthened and the sovereignty of Jordan was saved.

Similarly, in August and September, 1970, Lebanon asserted the priority of her national interest as against the fedayeen demands and behavior. The dispute between the government and the guerrillas had been simmering for nearly two years, with an occasional clash. The policy of concessions to the fedayeen, characteristic of the presidency of Charles Helou (1964–1970), aroused much criticism and spurred demands for a stronger reassertion of the government's authority. The election, in August, 1970, of Suleiman Franjeh as President was interpreted as a vote for the "Lebanon-first" orientation. One of the first acts of the new President was to refuse permission to an armed group of fedayeen arriving by plane from Iraq to disembark at the Beirut airport. The President's firmness was applauded not only by the traditional "Lebanon-firsters," i.e., the Christians and the Shia Muslims, but also by many Sunni Muslims who tended to look to Cairo for guidance. Cairo, this time, was also against extremism.

In the course of the fall, Syria was the scene of a power struggle between the "ideological" left wing of the Baath party and its

military wing led by Defense Minister General Hafez Assad. By mid-November Assad had removed his opponents (General Salah Jadid, President el-Attassi and a few others) from their key positions in the state and the party, thus inaugurating a rule which was expected to be more pragmatic and less given to ideologically inspired slogans. Moreover, his expressed readiness to cooperate more closely with the U.A.R. testified to his desire to coordinate Syria's policy with that of Cairo at a time when the latter appeared to favor greater realism in Arab-Israeli relations.

Thus it is certain that in all four countries surrounding Israel the trend toward restraint and moderation was in the ascendancy in the fall of 1970. Egypt's role in promoting this trend was crucial. Moreover, the moderate orientation was in harmony with the Soviet policy which, while strongly pro-Arab, favored a peaceful solution, supported the 1967 U.N. resolution, and strove for an early reopening of the Suez Canal. Yet it would be premature to speak of any lasting setbacks to Arab radicalism. While the radical trends—this time manifested in foreign policy—were arrested, they could easily revive in case of a new deterioration in Arab-Israeli relations.

U.S. POLICY

This brings us to the role that United States policy is playing in the fortunes of Arab radicalism. The more the United States identifies itself with Israel—by supplying her with offensive weapons and endorsing, however implicitly, some of her territorial claims—the greater the likelihood that Arab radicals will regain their ascendancy and that prospects for peace will diminish. What is at issue is whether the United States policy will be seen in the Middle East as even-handed

(Continued on page 52)

George Lenczowski lived in the Middle East from 1938 to 1945 and has made many trips to the area since then. Among his other works is *The Middle East in World Affairs* (3d ed.; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962).

"... the Persian Gulf states form an international region in more than just a geographical sense... there is a pattern to be seen in the developments now taking place in the region. As British influence retreats from the area, the regional powers seem to be jockeying for position..."

The Persian Gulf Region

By ROY E. THOMAN

Associate Professor of Government, West Texas State University

THE LITTORAL STATES of the Persian Gulf, including Muscat and Oman, the Trucial States, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran, provide the focus of this article. These Persian Gulf states form an international region in more than merely a geographical sense,¹ and as British influence is withdrawn, regional power politics assume increasing importance. To delineate the pattern taking shape, historical experience, ideology, communications, antagonistic and cooperative relationships among the regional states, and the roles played by external (intrusive) powers should be examined.²

MUSCAT AND OMAN

Stretching along the southeastern coastal area of the Arabian Peninsula and guarding the entrance to the Persian Gulf is the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. The present reigning Sultan, Qabus ben Said, belongs to the dynasty of Al bu Said, which was

originally founded in 1774 by Ahmad ben Said. British dealings with the rulers of the country date back to 1798. In that year, the British government, through the East India Company, concluded the first treaty of commerce and navigation.³ Over the years the British made other agreements with the Omani sultans for political and humanitarian reasons.⁴ As the power of the sultans gradually declined, they came to depend more and more on British power to help suppress restless tribal dissidents. The British, realizing the danger of instability, chose to accommodate the sultans in a limited way. And this symbiotic relationship between the British and the descendants of Ahmad ben Said continues to the present day.

Significant recent developments in Muscat and Oman include the forced abdication, in July, 1970, of Sultan Said ben Taimur in favor of his son, Qabus ben Said, and the growth of the revolutionary movement in the western part of the nation.

Said ben Taimur, who had reigned since 1932, ran the country like a medieval potentate from his large but crumbling palace located in Salalah, in the western Omani province of Dhufar. The Sultan completely isolated himself from his people, forbade electricity, banned the wearing of spectacles, shoes and Western clothing, and denied his people the advantages of either education or modern medicine. His policies left 95 per cent of the populace illiterate and such public

¹ Bruce M. Russett, *International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1967), p. 11.

² Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, *The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 5.

³ Husain M. Albaharna, *The Legal Status of the Arabian Gulf States: A Study of Their Treaty Relations and Their International Problems* (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1968), p. 3.

⁴ Briton C. Busch, *Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894-1914* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 9.

services as paved roads and water systems totally undeveloped. Slavery was practiced, and at least 500 slaves were attached to the palace.⁵

Under these circumstances it is not surprising that civil war broke out in 1958. At first, the war was confined to the Sultan's tribal enemies, on the one hand, and his 12,000-man army, on the other. Gradually, however, the British were brought into the picture, and this was followed by the appearance of a Peking-supported guerrilla organization.⁶ As recently as 1965, the rebellion, centered in Dhufar, was a nationalist movement directed against Sultan Said's regime in Salalah. But the departure of the British from Aden in 1967 and the entry of Chinese influence through the radical People's Republic of South Yemen helped Communist revolutionaries seize the initiative from the nationalists.

The rebellion took on its present character in 1968 when a small number of Dhufaris returned from guerrilla and political training in Peking and created the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf. There are now approximately 550 hard-core guerrillas, supported by a "people's militia" of more than 1,000, who dominate the Dhufari population. A few Chinese instructors are known to be fighting with the guerrillas.

Sultan Said's inability to develop an army capable of fighting an anti-insurgency war or to win the population over to the side of the government caused a situation in which the revolutionary character of the war flourished. Instead, he resorted to such dismal tactics as reducing the food supplies for the Dhufari population in an effort to starve them into submission.⁷

In contrast to his father, the new ruler, 29-year-old, Oxford-educated Sultan Qabus

ben Said, has pledged to modernize his nation of about one million people.⁸ Fortunately, a major oil field has been discovered which yields the Sultanate over \$100 million a year in revenue.

One of the new Sultan's first acts was to offer amnesty to the rebels in Dhufar. He also removed food restrictions and opened up medical treatment for the Dhufari population. The Sultan's exiled uncle, Tariq ben Taimur, accepted the new ruler's invitation to become Prime Minister and form a government.

THE TRUCIAL STATES

Stretching along the western shores of the Persian Gulf between Qatar and Oman are the territories of the Trucial States. The names of these sheikhdoms, running from west to east, are Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, Ras al-Khaimah, and Fujairah.

The rulers of the small sheikhdoms established their independence at various places along the coast of Oman (later termed the Pirate Coast) long before they had any contact with the British authorities. Formal relations between these sheikhdoms and Great Britain were established after the East India Company conducted a military expedition in the area in 1819. Subsequently, in 1820, the sheikhs concluded a general treaty with the British government in which they agreed to abstain from acts of piracy and to maintain a lasting peace between themselves and the British. This treaty was followed by the Perpetual Treaty of Peace of 1853⁹ and the Exclusive Agreements of 1892 which today constitute the basis of British special treaty relations with these sheikhdoms.¹⁰

The population of the Trucial sheikhdoms is small, totalling only about 120,000, with the total land area being 30,000 square miles. The largest state by far is Abu Dhabi, with 26,000 square miles, while the most populous is Dubai, with 60,000 residents.

The Trucial States have been dealt with collectively by the British government ever since treaty relations were established, with Sharjah later serving as the headquarters for the British political officers. A significant

⁵ *The Times* (London), Aug. 3, 1970, p. 6.

⁶ *Kayhan International* (Iran), July 1, p. 4.

⁷ *The Times* (London), Aug. 3, 1970, p. 6.

⁸ *Kayhan International* (Iran), July 27, 1970, p. 1.

⁹ The "truce" thus established became the basis for the name "Trucial."

¹⁰ Albaharna, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

step was taken in 1951 when a military force was created that became known as the Trucial Oman Scouts. Officered by British personnel, the Trucial Scouts played a major role in driving the Saudi forces from the Buraimi Oasis during the crisis of 1955.¹¹

A major change in British policy towards the Trucial States occurred in January, 1968, when the British Labour government announced that it had decided to withdraw all its forces from the Persian Gulf area by the end of 1971. This abrupt shift in policy shocked the rulers and they began to worry about their future without British support. In response to the British decision, the Union of the Arabian Gulf Sheikdoms was proposed in February, 1968.

As of this writing, however, nothing positive has resulted from this call for union or federation. Despite a flurry of diplomatic activity, there is as yet no agreement concerning even the scope of the proposed federation—whether membership should be confined to the Trucial States, or should include Bahrain, Qatar, and perhaps even Kuwait as well. Should there eventually be an accord, the resulting organization will most likely take the form of a confederation, with each member state retaining its sovereignty.

There is evidence to support the belief that at least a few of the rulers, among them Sheikh Rashid of Abu Dhabi, would consider continued British military presence beyond 1971, provided that some of the more anachronistic features of the protectorate system were abolished.¹² Feelings of uneasiness concerning the British withdrawal have been nourished by the recent renewal of Saudi claims to the Buraimi Oasis, as well as Iranian claims to several Persian Gulf islands.

Although the notion of a fixed boundary line in the desert is alien to the traditional

bedouin mind, the growth of British influence in the Persian Gulf area, together with the discovery of oil, manifested the need for exact delimitation of desert borders.

The only boundary dispute of relevance for this study is the one between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi concerning jurisdiction over the Buraimi Oasis. The tangled diplomatic history of the disagreement will not be recapitulated here.¹³ It will only be pointed out that because of frustration and disappointment over the progress of negotiations, the Saudi government decided to act unilaterally and in August, 1952, sent a party headed by Emir Turki to the Buraimi Oasis to assert Saudi sovereignty over the disputed territory. Saudi control did not last long, however. In October, 1955, after the failure of an arbitration effort, the British-officered forces of the sheikh of Abu Dhabi entered Buraimi, overpowered the Saudi military contingent, and occupied the entire oasis. Britain then proclaimed a new boundary line which, of course, excluded the Saudis from the area. This action abruptly concluded one phase of the dispute.¹⁴

In May, 1970, however, Abu Dhabi's ruler was informed by the Saudi government that the Buraimi Oasis was still regarded as part of Saudi territory. Saudi Arabia's King Faisal subsequently demanded a plebiscite in the Buraimi villages to decide the question of sovereign rights. He further insisted that before the plebiscite is held the "former Saudi inhabitants of the area" should be allowed to return and be given three or four months to settle down.¹⁵ Thus, if British troops are indeed withdrawn from the Persian Gulf in 1971, it is quite doubtful if tiny Abu Dhabi will be able to block a determined Saudi effort to retake the Buraimi Oasis.

Another complex jurisdictional problem involves three small islands near the entrance of the Persian Gulf. These islands, guarding the Strait of Hormuz, are the Great Thumb, the Little Thumb, and Abu Musa. The first two are regarded by the British as part of the sheikdom of Ras al-Khaimah, and they recognize the last as belonging to the sheikdom of Sharjah. The issue is compli-

¹¹ Tareq Y. Ismael, *Governments and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East* (Homewood: The Dorsey Press, 1970), p. 447.

¹² *The Times* (London), July 14, 1970, p. 5.

¹³ For an excellent concise account of the Buraimi Oasis dispute see: George Lenczowski, *Oil and State in the Middle East* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), pp. 141-152.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 146-147.

¹⁵ *The Times* (London), July 16, 1970, p. 5.

cated, however, by the fact that the sheikhdom of Umm al-Qaiwain also claims Abu Musa.¹⁶

Aside from their strategic location, the islands are highly valued in anticipation of a rich oil strike, either on the islands or in the surrounding continental shelf.

In light of the expected British withdrawal in 1971, it is revealing that the Iranian government has recently decided to reiterate claims to sovereignty over the three islands, based mainly on historical evidence.¹⁷ The following statement by the editor of *Kayhan International* is representative of Iranian opinion:

... The two Thumbs are Persian, in name and fact. No one, neither friend nor foe, can determine the fate of the Iranian islands or arrogate the rights to them.

Iran has reasserted its sovereignty over the twin Thumbs—and for that matter Abu Musa. As far as Iran is concerned, the islands have reverted to Iran and nothing that the sheikhs . . . do can change that.¹⁸

The warning is clear enough as to what the three sheikhdoms may expect after the withdrawal of British protection.

QATAR

During the first half of the nineteenth century, Qatar was regarded by the British as a dependency of Bahrain and for that reason was not asked to join in the treaties of peace signed with Bahrain and the other sheikhdoms. In 1868, however, the British signed an agreement of peace with the Sheikh of Qatar which acknowledged, although indirectly, the title of Sheikh Muhammad ibn al-Thani to Qatar and formed a basis for the emergence of Qatar for the first time in history as an independent entity owing no allegiance to Bahrain.¹⁹ In November, 1916, another agreement was signed between Qatar and the British government which, in effect, extended British protection to Qatar.

¹⁶ *Kayhan International* (Iran), April 16, 1970, p. 4.

¹⁷ *Kayhan International* (Iran), May 23, 1970, p. 1.

¹⁸ Editorial, *Kayhan International* (Iran), June 9, 1970, p. 1.

¹⁹ Albaharna, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

²⁰ *Kayhan International* (Iran), April 25, 1970, p. 4.

In the years after the treaty of 1916 the political system changed very little. The country continued to be headed by a sheikh chosen from among the al-Thani family with the formal blessings of the British Agent.

In anticipation of British withdrawal in 1971, however, there have recently been some political developments that are worth noting. A provisional constitution was promulgated in April, 1970, which provides for an Advisory Council, as well as a Cabinet. The Council is designed to give the people a limited opportunity to learn something about democracy. As an advisory body, the Council can only make recommendations, but it will have the power to debate draft laws, budgets and the government's general policies. It can also petition the Prime Minister or any minister to make statements on policy questions.

The provisional constitution affirms that the Ruler, currently Sheikh Ahmad ben Ali al-Thani, is the Head of State to whom "loyalty and absolute obedience must be pledged." The Deputy Ruler, Sheikh Khalifa ben Hamad al-Thani, is head of the Cabinet as Prime Minister and is responsible both to the Ruler and to the nation for the implementation of the laws and programs of the government.²⁰ The first Qatari Cabinet, announced in May, 1970, included ten portfolios, seven of them held by members of the al-Thani family. No portfolios for foreign affairs or defense were announced since these duties are still held by Britain under existing treaty obligations.

From this brief discussion of the developing constitutional system it is obvious that the al-Thani family intends to continue virtually to monopolize political power. Nevertheless, because of the relatively high standard of living and the existence of such welfare benefits as free medical service and free education for everyone, made possible by oil revenue, serious unrest is felt to be unlikely. With an estimated population of only 55,000, Qatar received over \$80 million from oil production in 1969.

BAHRAIN

Bahrain is an archipelago of over 30 is-

lands, lying in the Persian Gulf some 15 miles at the nearest point from Saudi Arabia, about 18 miles from the tip of the Qatar Peninsula, and approximately 150 miles from the coast of Iran. Only five islands are inhabited, with nearly all the population living on three. Bahrain itself, on which the capital of Manama is situated, is by far the largest in area, approximately 30 miles long and 20 miles in width at the widest point. Bahrain and the other two islands, Muharraq and Sitra, form a complex covering an area of approximately 226 square miles. The population has grown at a rapid rate in recent years and is currently around 200,000.

British treaty relations with Bahrain were begun as early as 1861, when the British government signed a convention with the ruler, Sheikh Muhammad Al-Khalifa. More intimate ties were established with Bahrain through the treaties of protection of 1880 and 1892.

The present ruler of Bahrain is Sheikh Issa ben Salman Al-Khalifa, the tenth member of the Khalifa family to rule the nation. He was appointed to the Council of Regency in 1953 and Heir Apparent five years later. Sheikh Issa, who is 37 years old, succeeded his father, Sheikh Salman, in 1961. The Ruler's son, Sheikh Hamad, who is 20 years old, is Crown Prince and commander of the armed forces.

While enjoying ultimate authority, Sheikh Issa has given considerable power to his brother, Sheikh Khalifa, who is the emirate's chief executive officer. The Crown Prince, another brother of the Ruler, and other relatives also take part in the affairs of state. The Khalifa family thus dominates the political system of Bahrain.

As a historical backdrop for an analysis of recent international developments concerning Bahrain, some mention should be made of the archipelago's stormy involvement in Persian Gulf politics. First of all, Bahrain has a long-standing claim to Zubara, a small village on the west coast of the Qatar Peninsula. The

claim is based on the fact that Zubara was owned by the al-Khalifa sheikhs for a considerable time after they established themselves there in 1766. Zubara was al-Khalifa property until the 1870's, when the Ottomans occupied Qatar and appointed the al-Thani sheikhs as rulers over the area in which Zubara lies. Zubara served as the burial site for the al-Khalifa family, and for this reason, as well as others, Bahrain would like to regain the area.

At the height of Wahabi power in the nineteenth century, Saudi Arabia exercised some control over Bahrain, and this served as the basis for later claims. The Sultan of Muscat also attempted from time to time to justify title to Bahrain. These two claims have little relevance for the present era, however, and will not be discussed further.

A much more serious controversy developed over Iran's claim to sovereignty over Bahrain. The Anglo-Iranian dispute may be summarized in the following manner.²¹ The Portuguese had governed Bahrain from 1522 to 1602, but in the latter year the Persians conquered the island and it remained under their domination until 1783. Even during the years after 1602, the Persian occupation was not uninterrupted, but Persia's final loss of Bahrain did not come until 1783, when it was conquered by the Utubi rulers of Zubara, from the Qatar coast. The present al-Khalifa rulers of Bahrain are descendants of this Utubi tribe.

Although too weak militarily to reconquer the islands, Iran's interest in regaining control persisted, and in 1822 an agreement was concluded between Persian authorities and the British Political Resident in the Gulf, Captain William Bruce, in which the latter recognized the Persian title to Bahrain. It is necessary to point out, however, that the agreement had not been authorized by the British government in Bombay. It was therefore denounced by the Governor of Bombay, and Captain Bruce was removed from his post.

After this incident, Iranian designs on Bahrain were shelved for over 20 years, until 1845, when the Prime Minister of Iran de-

²¹ For a more detailed analysis of the Anglo-Iranian controversy see Albaharna, *op. cit.*, pp. 167-195.

livered an elaborate note to the British government setting forth his government's claim. Additional correspondence took place in the 1860's. In 1927, an Iranian note of protest to the British government maintained that Bahrain was "incontestably" an Iranian possession. A bill to make Bahrain the fourteenth province of Iran, giving Bahrain the right to return a deputy, was introduced into the *Majlis* (parliament) in November, 1957. Consequently, Iran did not recognize the Bahrainian authorities.

On the other hand, since 1820 Great Britain has acted on the assumption that Bahrain is an independent sheikhdom. The Iranian claims have been rejected as being of a purely historical nature, and therefore weak. The British have also consistently maintained that following the Iranian occupation (1602–1783), Bahrain established her independence sufficiently to obliterate any Iranian claims.

This deadlocked state of affairs worried those observers who feared that hostilities would erupt over the status of Bahrain after the withdrawal of British protection in 1971. However, Iran began to retreat from its earlier hard line on Bahrain, and in 1968 and 1969 the Shah made the conciliatory move of indicating on several occasions that Iran would accept the results of a referendum on Bahrain if the United Nations supervised it.²²

Thus, after securing the agreement of Britain, Iran and Bahrain, in March, 1970, United Nations Secretary General U Thant designated a personal emissary, Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi, to consult with the people of Bahrain about their future. This was the first time that the Secretary General had undertaken a good-offices mission directly to determine the wishes of the people of an emerging state.

After interviewing a broad cross-section of the Bahrainian population, Guicciardi concluded in his report issued in May:

My consultations have convinced me that the overwhelming majority of the people of Bahrain

wish to gain recognition of their identity in a fully independent and sovereign state free to decide for itself its relations with other states.

A short time later the U.N. Security Council unanimously endorsed the report. The Iranian *Majlis* then approved a resolution acknowledging the right of Bahrain to assume the status of a sovereign and independent state. The voting was 184 in favor of the resolution and 4 against, with the only opposition coming from the ultranationalist Pan Iranian party.

From all indications, then, the problem of Bahrain's international status has been resolved—and with a degree of dispatch and good will that few would have thought possible.

THE REGIONAL POWERS

The states discussed so far—Muscat and Oman, the Trucial Sheikdoms, Qatar, and Bahrain—collectively make up the potential *power vacuum* one often sees mentioned in connection with the British withdrawal. The *powers* of the Persian Gulf region, on the other hand, consist of Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Before considering certain dimensions of their regional policies, it should be pointed out that all four states are in agreement that Great Britain should leave the area on schedule.

In January, 1968, the Labour government committed Great Britain to withdrawing her military forces from the area by the end of 1971, but the issue became clouded when the Conservative party, under Edward Heath, won an upset victory in June, 1970. In a campaign manifesto, the Tories had insisted that they would retain British forces in the Persian Gulf if they won the election.

By early July, there was some indication that the Conservatives had modified their rigid pre-election stand. In a speech before the House of Commons, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the new Foreign Minister, said, "We don't want to force our way in where we are not wanted, but where we are wanted and can contribute to political stability, there we ought to be."²³ So there is the possibility

²² *The Christian Science Monitor*, April 7, 1970, p. 3.

²³ *Kayhan International* (Iran), July 14, 1970, p. 1.

that a British military presence will be retained in one or more of the Trucial States, as well as on Masirah Island and at Salalah, on the south coast of Muscat and Oman.²⁴

Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait oppose a continuation of a British presence in the Persian Gulf because they feel that (1) they now possess sufficient military power to handle regional defense; (2) British military strength amounts to only about 6,000 men, a totally inadequate force to provide realistic security; (3) the British troops are more likely to be an incitement to extremist groups than a deterrent; and (4) the British military presence might serve as an excuse for some other extra-regional power (such as the Soviet Union or Red China) to establish a base in the Persian Gulf region.

Much of the conflict in the area emanates from the bitter relations existing between the adjacent states of Iraq and Iran. The conflict has ramifications throughout the Persian Gulf region.

In April, 1969, a dispute erupted between Iran and Iraq over the status of the Shatt al-Arab border waterway.²⁵ It began when the Iraqis started massing troops at the mouth of the river. This was followed by high-level diplomatic talks in Baghdad designed to work out all differences, particularly those concerning navigation on the border river. But the talks collapsed and the controversy deepened after an Iranian fisherman was shot dead and others were arrested by the Iraqis for using the river.

The Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister, Nema al-Nema, then informed the Iranian Ambassador to Baghdad, Ezzatollah Ameli, that ships found flying the Iranian colors or employing Iranian pilots in the Shatt would be ordered to bring down the flag and discharge the Iranian personnel. Failing this, al-Nema

threatened, the offending vessels would be fired on. Had Iran accepted the Iraqi terms it would have amounted to a recognition of Iraq's sovereignty over the entire waterway, an Iraqi "right" that was becoming outdated.

Instead, Iran took up the challenge and began to build up her own defenses on the Shatt. Escalating the war of nerves, Iran started sending her ships through the Shatt under full military escort. The Iraqis watched and protested, but hostilities did not break out.

It was around this time that Iran unilaterally declared the 1937 Shatt al-Arab treaty null and void, claiming that the treaty, which gives Iraq sovereign power over shipping rights in a navigable frontier river, is a vestige of imperialism and contrary to contemporary international rules and practices. Iran has indicated that a new treaty on navigational rights in the waterway must be developed on the basis of the *thalweg* principle,²⁶ and that Iran should enjoy the same rights on the Shatt al-Arab as, for example, riparian states enjoy along the Rhine and the Danube. As of this writing, however, the dispute has not been resolved.


A fresh crisis occurred as the result of an abortive coup on January 20, 1970, against the Baath (Arab Socialist) regime of Iraq. Accusing the United States Central Intelligence Agency and Iran of collusive involvement in the coup attempt, the Iraqis proceeded to expel the Iranian ambassador and four other diplomats on January 22, and closed down three Iranian consulates. Iran retaliated by expelling the Iraqi ambassador and four Iraqi military attaches, and by closing Iraqi consulates. Other points of friction between the two countries include Iraqi treatment of Iranians living in Iraq, and the allegation that Iran has aided Kurdish insurgents in Iraq.

The conflict is not without its ideological dimension. In July, 1970, Iraqi President Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr proposed an *all Arab* defense organization to replace Great Britain in the Persian Gulf. Stating that the vacuum created by British withdrawal could be filled

²⁴ The British bases on Masirah Island and at Salalah were not included in the Labour government's 1971 withdrawal plan.

²⁵ The Shatt al-Arab is a river about 120 miles long, formed by the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. It flows through Iraq to the Persian Gulf, and forms part of the Iraq-Iran border.

²⁶ The *thalweg* principle holds that where an international boundary line is formed by a river, the center of the main channel is the boundary.



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PERSIAN GULF AREA

only by the Arab people of the region, Bakr rejected any non-Arab (Iranian) claim of sovereignty over any part of the Persian Gulf.

This statement is of particular interest in light of the recent discovery of substantial oil reserves in the continental shelf in the northern Persian Gulf area. Iran is pressing Kuwait to sign an agreement to delimit their common sea frontiers as soon as possible, but Iraq has said that she will not recognize such an agreement. From the standpoint of international law, it is difficult to imagine how Iraq, a Persian Gulf littoral state located be-

tween Kuwait and Iran, could be excluded from underseas oil rights in the area.

Iran, of course, rejects Iraq's attempts to exclude "non-Arab" influence from the area, pointing out that Iraq has only 40 kilo-

(Continued on page 50)

Roy E. Thoman held the Kentucky Research Foundation Fellowship, the Haggin Fellowship and the William A. Patterson Fellowship while preparing his doctoral dissertation. He has just received a grant from West Texas State University to do research in his field.

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

The U.S. Initiative Toward Peace in the Middle East

At a press conference on June 25, 1970, United States Secretary of State William Rogers revealed that the United States had launched a "major political initiative" to seek a peace settlement in the Middle East. His statement follows:

• • •

Turning now to the Middle East, I would like to make a brief statement about the Middle East. Recent disquieting events in the Middle East led President Nixon, on April 29, to order a thorough review of all political and military aspects of this problem. That review has now been concluded.

As a consequence of the review, the United States has undertaken a political initiative, a major political initiative, the objective of which is to encourage the parties to stop shooting and start talking under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring [Gunnar Jarring, U.N. Special Representative] in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council.

Our objective in launching this initiative has been to encourage the parties to move toward a just and lasting peace which takes fully into account the legitimate aspirations and concerns of

all governments and of all peoples in the area.

In the light of that objective, we believe that it would not be useful, particularly because of the sensitive nature of the discussions now under way, the diplomatic discussions now under way, to disclose at this time the details of the political initiative or to discuss publicly military assistance for Israel.

We firmly believe that this is the time for such an initiative, which we have launched directly with the parties and with other interested powers. We are now in the process of having further discussions, getting the responses of other governments to this initiative, and we very seriously and profoundly hope that this initiative, taken together in collaboration with others, will result in the beginning of discussions which might lead to a peaceful solution of this problem that has plagued the Middle East for 20 years. Thank you.

The Rogers Letter to U.A.R. Foreign Minister Riad

A letter dated June 19, 1970, from Secretary of State Rogers to U.A.R. Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad, urging a cease-fire and making other proposals for a Middle East settlement, was made public by the State Department July 22, after the U.A.R. made the letter public. The full text follows:

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JUNE 19, 1970

DEAR MR. FOREIGN MINISTER: I have read carefully President Nasser's statement of May 1 and your subsequent remarks to Mr. Bergus [Donald C. Bergus, Counselor of Embassy and Consul General, U. S. Special Interests Section, Spanish Embassy, Cairo]. Mr. Sisco [Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs] has also reported fully on his conversations with President Nasser and you, and we have been giving serious thought to what can be done about the situation in the Near East.

I agree that the situation is at a critical point and I think it is in our joint interest that the United States retain and strengthen friendly ties with all the peoples and states of the area. We hope this will prove possible and are prepared to do our part. We look to others concerned, and in particular to your government, which has so important a role to play, to move with us to seize this opportunity. If it is lost, we shall all suffer the consequences and we would regret such an outcome very much indeed. In this spirit, I urge

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BOOK REVIEWS

ON THE MIDDLE EAST

BONN AND JERUSALEM: THE STRANGE COALITION. By INGE DEUTSCHKRON. (Philadelphia: Chilton Book Company, 1970. 357 pages, bibliography and index, \$13.95.)

European journalist Inge Deutschkron, now with *Maariv*, Tel Aviv's evening newspaper, has written a detailed and well annotated account of the people and events involved in the establishment of diplomatic relations between Bonn and Israel. She describes the feelings of the defeated German people and the Jewish survivors of the Nazi state. The attempts of the Arab states to prevent the establishment of diplomatic relations are also described. From personal interviews with many of the leaders of both countries and with other world figures, Miss Deutschkron is able to piece together a remarkable document.

O.E.S.

MIDDLE EAST OIL: A STUDY IN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTROVERSY. By GEORGE W. STOCKING. (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1970. 484 pages, appendix, selected bibliography and index, \$15.00.)

Over 10 years of research and a half century of familiarity with United States oil interests have gone into this authoritative work on Middle East oil. The book is divided into five sections, each examining an aspect of the history and the social and economic conditions at the time of early oil-lease negotiations, the provisions and controversies over the concessions, the economics of oil pricing and the prospects for the future demands for oil in a politically unstable atmosphere. The last footnote in this detailed study declares that the possibilities of a full-scale Arab-Israeli conflict make "any prognostication regarding the future of Middle East oil . . . hazard-

ous." This does not detract from the book's usefulness as a historical study.

O.E.S.

A PALESTINE ENTITY. By DON PERETZ, EVAN M. WILSON AND RICHARD J. WARD. (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1970. 119 pages, \$1.75, paper.)

The three authors of this book attempt to describe the history, the reality and the goal of Palestinian Arab nationalism. They believe that the Palestinians have developed a nationalist credo that is distinctive but still links them with the broader Arab nationalist aspirations in surrounding countries. The importance of Jerusalem to Arabs and Israelis for religious and economic reasons is explained. Various possible solutions for the Palestinians are explored.

O.E.S.

COMMUNIST CHINA'S INTERACTION WITH THE ARAB NATIONALISTS SINCE THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE. By JOSEPH E. KHALILI. (Jericho, N.Y.: Exposition Press, 1970. 121 pages, \$7.50.)

Although there would seem to be fundamental ideological differences between world communism and Arab nationalism, political, economic and cultural ties between Communist China and the Arab nations have developed since the 1955 Bandung Conference. In this study, the common ground between the countries in the Sino-Arab group is explored and the setbacks in their relationship are discussed. Khalili believes that the battle for the Arab world has not yet been won by any of the competing superpowers.

O.E.S.

ISLAM: A WAY OF LIFE. By PHILIP K. HIRTI. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1970. 198 pages, selected bibliography and index, \$6.50.)

The distinguished orientalist, Philip Hitti, has written about Islam as a way of life that involves religion, politics and culture. The once extensive Islamic state has splintered into fragments; Islamic culture is expressed chiefly through the Arabic tongue. Islam, the religion, has survived the pressures of modernization, to a large degree, with a "solid core of dogma" still intact. This excellent study portrays the way of life of one-seventh of the world's peoples.

O.E.S.

EMBASSIES IN CRISIS. By MICHAEL BAR-ZOHAR. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1970. 269 pages, bibliography and index, \$8.95.)

This well written study of the "Diplomats and Demagogues behind the Six-Day War" offers an exciting behind-the-scenes glimpse of the political and military maneuvers of the Arabs, the Israelis and the Big Powers during the Middle East crisis of June, 1967. In time, it covers a month-long period, from May 14 through June 10, in day-by-day journal form. Michael Bar-Zohar, journalist and one-time press secretary to the Israeli Defense Ministry, writes a subjective but documented account of the crisis from the Israeli point of view. The book has been skillfully translated from the French by Monroe Stearns.

O.E.S.

YUGOSLAVIA AND THE NON-ALIGNED WORLD. By ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970. 333 pages, bibliography and index, \$11.00.)

Rubinstein's study of Yugoslavia's turn to nonalignment after her break with the U.S.S.R., and of her relations with other Third World countries—particularly the U.A.R.—is the definitive work on the subject. The research is exhaustive, the insights are penetrating and the style is consistently interesting.

A fascinating picture emerges of the

relationship between Tito and Nasser. No less interesting is the analysis of Yugoslavia's attitude toward Israel. Rubinstein's prognoses on the Yugoslav future are perceptive.

O.E.S.

MISCELLANY

DEMOCRATIC VISTAS: 1860-1880. EDITED BY ALAN TRACHTENBERG. (New York: George Braziller, 1970. 366 pages and bibliography, \$7.50.)

THE LAND OF CONTRASTS: 1880-1901. EDITED BY NEIL HARRIS. (New York: George Braziller, 1970. 362 pages and bibliography, \$7.50.)

THE CALL OF THE WILD: 1900-1916. EDITED BY RODERICK NASH. (New York: George Braziller, 1970. 329 pages and bibliography, \$7.50.)

These volumes represent numbers 6, 7 and 8 in Braziller's "The American Culture Series." Following an introduction by the editor, a broad selection of magazine articles and book excerpts has been chosen to show examples of the arts, amusements, sociology and economy of the period. The books are fun to leaf through and serve as useful supplements to texts on the periods. The illustrations are apt and reasonably well reproduced.

O.E.S.

A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, VOL. I. By NORMAN A. GRAEBNER, GILBERT C. FITE AND PHILIP L. WHITE. (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1970. 970 pages, illustrations, appendix and index. \$10.50.)

A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, VOL. III. By NORMAN A. GRAEBNER, GILBERT C. FITE AND PHILIP L. WHITE. (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1970. 1329 pages, illustrations, suggested readings, appendix and index, \$11.00.)

Lavishly illustrated, attractively printed and very well written, these are books to treasure and browse through. Although they are apparently directed at the high school market where they should be most welcome, they will be valuable library

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ISRAELI POLITICS

(Continued from page 25)

develop in which official measures of repression and unauthorized Jewish counterterror and mob eruptions might combine to produce a climate reminiscent of Algerian days though in no way presaging an Algerian conclusion. However, the record of 1970 seems to indicate that the insurgency has passed its peak and that the trend, if not headed downward, has settled on a plateau that is not very menacing.

In short, then, the "substructure" on which the Israeli political configuration rests is firm enough to endure and even prosper in the years ahead. On the other hand, the political configuration itself has built into it enough weaknesses to expose it to possible if not probable breakdown. The unity of the national government and the political parties is primarily formal and rests on a decision not to decide or not to press for decisions on the substance of issues. This system is so prone to accidents or incidents—calculated leakages of Cabinet decisions, distortion or excessive criticism of a colleague's views, deliberate or innocent overstepping of the limits of individual discretion in word or in deed, disagreement in the Cabinet over the adoption of a specific action or reaction, and so on—that one could have safely predicted its breakdown were it not for the operation of a deterrent against breaking away in the form of the uncertainty of the outcome of "going to the country." The deterrent, however, is not absolute and the likelihood of breakdown remains high.

Another weakness of the system is its very heavy dependence on a personal leadership characterized by the possession of the qualities of a chairman or an arbitrator of disputes rather than of those of a chief with authority and ideas of his own. Golda Meir certainly has these particular qualities, but she is advanced in age and weak in health, and it may not prove easy to replace her with a suitable and generally acceptable successor. Consequently, a struggle for the succession might

develop which would involve men like Dayan and Allon, who are the "chief" rather than the "chairman" cut. The system would most probably break down in the process.

THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

(Continued from page 12)

achieving peaceful adjustment of the Palestine problem, largely because of the very complicated issues centering around the enduring conflict of two nationalisms over the same territory and the inability of the greater powers to face this conflict frankly. Nevertheless, the UNTSO and UNEF have rendered very useful services in the security field, while UNRWA has served the Arab refugees in the fields of relief, health and education. The General Assembly considered the Palestine problem—the Arab-Israeli conflict—in the fall of 1970. It seemed clear to thoughtful and informed observers that, if there were to be any hope of peaceful adjustment in this area of conflict, with all its potential for uncontrolled escalation, the United Nations would have to reassert the interests of the international community, make appropriate recommendations and decisions, and take constructive action.¹⁴

¹⁴ See especially American Friends Service Committee et al, *Search for Peace in the Middle East* (Philadelphia: 1970).

THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE

(Continued from page 31)

the Jordanian monarchy had once again survived and prevailed. Both the United States and Israel were prepared to take coordinated military action in support of King Hussein since they assumed he would be replaced by a regime closely linked to Moscow.

Although the Palestinians were unable to topple the King, it is unlikely that they will stop trying to regain their homeland, for youthful Palestinians are committed to it and are already filling the ranks of the guerrilla organizations depleted as a consequence of the recent revolt. Furthermore, the death of

President Nasser, who tried to restrain the guerrillas, and the fact that King Hussein killed more Palestinians than the Israelis ever did, may make the resistance movement even more influential. However, the Palestinians will be doomed to wander in the wilderness until they establish a truly unified command and forsake individual autonomy for military discipline.

THE PERSIAN GULF

(Continued from page 45)

meters of coastline, extending from the Fau estuary to the Strait of Hormuz. As a counterpoise to Arab nationalism, Iran (a Muslim but non-Arab country) has promoted the more inclusive ideology of "Islamic solidarity" for the region. Not surprisingly, this approach seems to be acceptable to most of the littoral Arab states, except for Iraq. Often in the Arab Middle East, Arab revolutionaries have raised the battle cry of "Arab nationalism" to overthrow traditional Arab leaders, and in every regional state, except for Iraq, there is some form of hereditary (traditional) rule.

At the beginning of this article it was pointed out that the Persian Gulf states form an international region in more than just a geographical sense, and that there is a pattern to be seen in the developments now taking place in the region. As British influence retreats from the area, the regional powers seem to be jockeying for position, with Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait forming a loose alliance against isolated Iraq.

Iraq accuses Saudi Arabia and Iran of seeking to carve out spheres of influence in the region and, as one reviews recent maneuvers involving the Buraimi Oasis and the Persian Gulf islands near the Strait of Hormuz, perhaps the charge has some validity. On the other hand, the Baathist leaders of Iraq have told Arab revolutionaries not to forget "our second Israel," meaning the Persian Gulf region. The hereditary rulers of the region fear that an alliance will be formed between Baghdad and the leftists in Southern Yemen, who are already to some

degree under Chinese Communist influence.

If the recent history of the Persian Gulf region is any guide to the future, this is an area to watch closely.

THE SOVIET ROLE

(Continued from page 18)

in some of these Middle Eastern countries.

Soviet commentators completely ignored the role of the Soviet Union in the United Nations decision to establish the state of Israel. The relentless outpouring of hatred against Israel and Zionism is in reality the expression of the deep Soviet frustration in the Middle East. It should be added that a careful examination reveals that even without the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Soviets would have been unable to make rapid progress in the Middle East because of the nature of the peoples of the area. In spite of the rallying cry against Israel, in spite of all efforts to unite the Arabs, the Middle Eastern Arab world is deeply divided; and the social and political factors necessary to unify the society ideologically are lacking. Nonetheless, the Soviet leaders do not appear to be ready to abandon their goals. As long as it retains its objectives, the Soviet Union remains a major factor in the Middle East.

CURRENT DOCUMENTS

(Continued from page 46)

that your government give the most careful consideration to the thoughts which I set forth below.

We are strongly interested in a lasting peace, and we would like to help the parties achieve it. We have made serious and practical proposals to that end, and we have counseled all parties on the need for compromise, and on the need to create an atmosphere in which peace is possible. By the latter we mean a reduction of tensions as well as clarifications of positions to give both Arabs and Israelis some confidence that the outcome will preserve their essential interests.

In our view, the most effective way to agree on a settlement would be for the parties to begin to work out under Ambassador Jarring's auspices the detailed steps necessary to carry out Security Council Resolution 242. Foreign Minister Eban of Israel has recently said that Israel would be prepared to make important concessions once talks

got started. At the same time, Egyptian participation in such talks would go far towards overcoming Israeli doubts that your government does in fact seek to make peace with it. I understand the problems that direct negotiations pose for you, and we have made it clear from the beginning that we were not proposing such an arrangement be put into effect at the outset, although, depending on the progress of discussions, we believe the parties will find it necessary to meet together at some point if peace is to be established between them.

With the above thoughts in mind, the US puts forward the following proposal for consideration of the UAR.

(a) that both Israel and the UAR subscribe to a restoration of the ceasefire for at least a limited period;

(b) that Israel and the UAR (as well as Israel and Jordan) subscribe to the following statement which would be in the form of a report from Ambassador Jarring to the Secretary General U Thant:

The UAR (Jordan) and Israel advise me that they agree:

(a) that having accepted and indicated their willingness to carry out Resolution 242 in all its parts, they will designate representatives to discussions to be held under my auspices, according to such procedure and at such places and times as I may recommend, taking into account as appropriate each side's preference as to method of procedure and previous experience between the parties;

(b) that the purpose of the aforementioned discussions is to reach agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace between them based on (1) mutual acknowledgment by the UAR (Jordan) and Israel of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, and (2) Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict, both in accordance with Resolution 242;

(c) that, to facilitate my task of promoting agreement as set forth in Resolution 242, the parties will strictly observe, effective July 1 until at least October 1, the ceasefire resolutions of the Security Council.

We hope the UAR will find this proposal acceptable; we are also seeking Israeli acceptance. In the meantime, I am sure you will share my conviction that everything be done to hold these proposals in confidence so as not to prejudice the prospects for their acceptance.

I am sending a similar message to Foreign Minister Rifai [of Jordan].

I look forward to your early reply.

With all best wishes,

Sincerely,

WILLIAM P. ROGERS

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 48)

acquisitions for the general reader and will find a place on the bedside table of many non-scholars.

In addition to the topics routinely covered in American history books, the sections on American art and illustration through the years, and on changing cultural tastes, are very well done. O.E.S.

POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT: HOW PEOPLE DECIDE THEIR FATE. BY KARL W. DEUTSCH. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970. 405 pages and index, \$5.50, paper.)

Deutsch has written an original text which will be welcomed by teachers and students alike. The first half of the book analyzes the myriad aspects of political science—from the ability of groups to learn from experience to the art of collecting taxes. The second half analyzes politics and government in 5 modern countries—the U. S., the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, France and West Germany—and here again the presentation is stimulating.

O.E.S.

TWO WORLDS OF CHILDHOOD: U.S. AND U.S.S.R. BY URIE BRONFENBRENNER with the assistance of JOHN C. CONDRY, JR. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970. 190 pages and index, \$7.95.)

The topic of this book is timely, interesting and original: a comparison of the ways in which children are socialized, i.e., imbued with ethical values and ideas, in the United States and the Soviet Union. The authors have had the opportunity to observe Soviet children in nurseries, schools and family situations and they succeed in describing the ways in which the focus in the U.S.S.R. on the collective or group affects the behavior and outlook of Soviet children.

A.Z.R.

ARAB RADICALISM

(Continued from page 37)

or as partial to one party. This seemed to be the guiding thought of Secretary William S. Rogers' policy statement of December 9, 1969.

Our policy [said the Secretary] is and will continue to be a balanced one. We have friendly ties with both Arabs and Israelis. . . . Therefore, our policy is to encourage the Arabs to accept a permanent peace based on a binding agreement and to urge the Israelis to withdraw from occupied territory when their territorial integrity is assured as envisaged by the Security Council resolution. . . . We believe that while recognized political boundaries must be established and agreed upon by the parties, any changes in the pre-existing lines should not reflect the weight of conquest and should be confined to insubstantial alterations required for mutual security. We do not support expansionism. We believe troops must be withdrawn as the resolution provides.

The Rogers' peace and cease-fire proposals subsequently presented on June 19, 1970, conformed in spirit to the above statement and, by reinvoking the United Nations resolution of 1967, again put the United States on record as favoring Israeli withdrawal within the framework of a negotiated peace.² Both statements made a serious impact on the governments and peoples of the area; moreover, the fact that the June 19 proposals were accepted by the U.A.R. and Jordan testified to the success that a policy of impartiality was bound to achieve. This policy was, however, exposed to a severe strain in the fall of 1970, when Israel and the U.A.R. exchanged accusations of cease-fire violations and when, after some hesitation, the United States veered toward the side of Israel in demanding a "rectification" by the U.A.R., i.e., the removal of those Soviet missiles which reportedly had been moved into the Suez Canal zone after the advent of the cease-fire on August 7. When, subsequently, the United States gave pledges to supply Israel with \$500 million in arms (including 18 new Phantom fighter-bombers) and \$250 million in economic aid, the policy enunciated in the

two earlier Rogers statements was in grave jeopardy.

The repeatedly heard American argument that the arming of Israel was designed to keep (or restore) military balance between Israel and the Arab states sounds unconvincing and even insulting to the Arab intelligentsia and provokes reactions of irritation and hostility which play into the hands of the radical groups. Once in control, the radicals have invariably turned toward the Soviet Union (and in some cases toward Communist China) thus paving the way toward greater Communist penetration—economic and military—of the region. Consequently, it may be said that the safeguarding of the United States position in the Persian Gulf-Mediterranean area—a position already seriously weakened—is causally linked with the strength and influence of the moderate groups in the Arab world. These groups exist not only in the conservative camp of the remaining Arab monarchies, but also in the states that have undergone a revolution but are still groping for a national policy that would best promote the security and welfare of their countries.

Arab radicalism has had a checkered record with regard to the domestic policies of the revolutionary states: economic planning has not provided the hoped-for panacea for society's ills; the broad masses have not gained any appreciable advances in their standard of living, while individual freedoms have often been severely curtailed. On the other hand, the much-advertised struggle against imperialism has often been a fight against the shadows rather than the substance which either was not there or was vanishing anyway. Yet it is on this issue of imperialism (Zionism being interpreted as its instrument) that the Arab radicals are likely to score their greatest successes as against the forces of moderation. The outcome of this struggle will depend as much on the interplay of social forces in the Arab lands as on the posture and policies of major Western powers, with the United States, rather obviously, standing in the forefront, closely watched by its friends and enemies alike.

² For the text of this statement see pp. 46ff. of this issue.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY chronology covering the most important events of November, 1970, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Berlin Crisis

Nov. 4—Following a 3-hour meeting of representatives of the Big Four (the Soviet Union, France, Britain and the United States) in Berlin, it is reported that some progress has been made towards solving the problems of the divided city.

Nov. 29—East Germany delays traffic on access roads to Berlin for the second day, protesting a West German political meeting in Berlin.

The U.S., France and Great Britain warn the U.S.S.R. that East German harassment on the access routes to Berlin is endangering the current 4-power talks.

Disarmament

Nov. 2—The strategic arms limitation talks are resumed in Helsinki, Finland, by the United States and the Soviet Union.

Nov. 19—The 6th session in the current round of talks on strategic arms limitation is held in Helsinki.

European Economic Community (Common Market)

Nov. 19—At a meeting in Munich, West Germany, the 6 member nations of E.E.C. (Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy and West Germany) agree to establish a system of consultation for the coordination of their foreign policies.

Middle East

(See also *Intl. United Nations*)

1. Arab-Israeli Conflict

Nov. 5—The 3-month extension of the Middle East cease-fire, proclaimed by the U.A.R., begins at midnight; the Israelis

now regard the truce as a day-to-day non-binding arrangement.

Nov. 6—Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan claims that the extension of the truce is less restrictive than the original agreement and that Israel is no longer bound to observe a military standstill in the Suez Canal truce zone.

Nov. 16—In a report to the *Knesset* (parliament), Israeli Premier Golda Meir implies that Israel may not require a full rollback of Soviet-U.A.R. missiles allegedly installed in violation of the August 7, 1970, cease-fire, but she still stresses the importance of the rollback. The Premier also refutes statements by Defense Minister Dayan that the arrangements for the cease-fire extension are less restrictive.

Nov. 17—*The New York Times* reports that about 10 days ago U.A.R. antiaircraft gunners fired on Israeli reconnaissance planes flying over U.A.R. territory along the west bank of the Suez Canal.

Nov. 19—U.A.R. President Anwar el-Sadat, in a speech to the National Assembly, says that there must be complete liberation of the Arab lands occupied by Israel in 1967 before there can be peace.

Nov. 23—The Israeli government accuses the U.A.R. of air incursions across the Suez Canal in violation of the terms of the cease-fire; no firing by either side is reported and the U.A.R. denies the charges.

Nov. 30—Washington officials reveal that American U-2 photographic plane flights over the Suez area were discontinued 3 weeks ago.

2. Jordanian Conflict

Nov. 3—Scattered fighting is reported in Amman, Jordan, between guerrillas and military police.

Nov. 9—The peace agreement between Arab commandos and the Jordanian government goes into effect at noon; the agreement calls for the withdrawal of all commandos (excluding so-called militiamen) from Amman.

Nov. 16—A spokesman for Al Fatah, the Palestinian guerrilla organization, reports that Jordanian Army troops attacked citizens in Irbid today; 35 persons are reported to have been killed or wounded.

Nov. 18—Fighting erupts in Amman between Palestinian guerrillas and the army; it continues for 2 hours.

United Nations

(See also *Guinea; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Nov. 4—In a 57-to-16 vote, the General Assembly adopts a resolution calling for a 3-month extension of the standstill ceasefire in the Middle East and for the unconditional resumption of Arab-Israeli peace talks under the auspices of Gunnar V. Jarring, Secretary General U Thant's special representative to the Middle East.

Nov. 5—Jarring meets separately with Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban and Muhammad H. el-Farra, the Jordanian representative to the U.N.

Nov. 12—During debate over the admission of Communist China and the expulsion of Nationalist China, the U.S. sponsors a resolution stipulating that a two-thirds majority vote is necessary to change the representation of China; Christopher H. Phillips, the Deputy Permanent Representative of the U.S., argues against the expulsion of Nationalist China from the U.N.; he refrains from commenting on the admission of Communist China.

Nov. 13—The General Assembly votes to refuse to confirm the credentials of South Africa as a member of the U.N. The move, a rebuke to South Africa's policy of racial separation, will not affect South Africa's right or ability to participate in the organization, in the opinion of legal experts.

Nov. 17—The Political Committee of the General Assembly votes, 91 to 2, to approve

a treaty which forbids the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the seabed outside the 12-mile limit of any nation; the treaty must be ratified by 22 nations.

The Security Council votes unanimously for strong action against the white supremacist leaders of Rhodesia; the resolution affirms past resolutions which put an embargo on trade with Rhodesia.

Nov. 19—Yakov A. Malik, the Soviet delegate to the U.N., addresses the General Assembly and calls for the admission of Communist China.

The Legal Committee of the General Assembly approves a strong resolution condemning hijacking and the kidnapping of hostages; the resolution calls on governments to suppress acts of piracy, to punish hijackers, or to extradite them for prosecution.

Nov. 20—In the General Assembly, 51 nations vote to admit Communist China to the U.N.; 49 nations vote against her admission. There are 25 abstentions. Because of an earlier vote requiring a two-thirds majority, Communist China is not admitted.

War in Indochina

Nov. 2—Saigon, South Vietnam, is shelled by the Vietcong for the first time in 3 months.

Nov. 3—In Saigon, the U.S. command announces the withdrawal of 1,510 men from South Vietnam, bringing the withdrawals announced in the last 3 days to 4,610.

Nov. 4—A U.S. air base in the Mekong Delta is transferred to the South Vietnamese Air Force.

Nov. 5—U.S. Secretary of the Air Force Robert C. Seamans, Jr., ending a 3-day visit to South Vietnam, reports that the North Vietnamese are carrying out an extensive build-up of supplies in their southern provinces.

The U.S. command reports that 24 U.S. servicemen were killed in Indochina last week, the lowest weekly toll in 5 years.

Nov. 6—Military spokesmen report that 6,000 South Vietnamese troops are taking

part in a new drive in southeastern Cambodia.

Nov. 8—The South Vietnamese command reports that North Vietnamese troops have attacked South Vietnamese posts in Cambodia and bases near the frontier.

The New York Times reports that discussions are being held between Cambodian officers and members of the entourage of Prince Boun Oum, the feudal chief of southern Laos, on the possibility of sending Cambodian troops to Laos to be trained and armed with U.S. weapons to operate in Laos and Cambodia.

Nov. 9—North Vietnamese and Vietcong troops attack military positions and towns northeast of Phnompenh, Cambodia.

Nov. 11—Cambodian troops are ambushed on Highway 7, 35 miles north of Phnompenh.

Nov. 13—After the announcement of the downing of a U.S. reconnaissance jet over North Vietnam, U.S. Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird warns the North Vietnamese of possible U.S. retaliation if U.S. reconnaissance planes are fired at.

In Washington, a spokesman for the U.S. government reports that North Vietnam has informed an American peace group of the deaths of 6 U.S. servicemen who were prisoners of war.

Nov. 14—The North Vietnamese delegate to the Paris peace talks denies that there was an understanding between his country and the U.S. about unarmed reconnaissance flights over North Vietnam; he declares that the U.S. will have to bear the responsibility for its actions.

Nov. 17—The U.S. military command reports that the Bienhoa air base in South Vietnam was attacked by rockets apparently fired by the Vietcong this morning; U.S. and South Vietnamese planes are based at Bienhoa.

Nov. 18—The South Vietnamese command reports that its forces in Cambodia have uncovered a large cache of war materials.

U.S. officials report that North Vietnam is infiltrating nearly twice as many troops southward this year as it did in 1969; the

infiltration rate has been stepped up since the end of the rainy season.

Nov. 21—U.S. bombing of North Vietnam resumes for a 24-hour period; U.S. Defense Secretary Laird claims that the attacks are being staged in retaliation for the downing of a U.S. reconnaissance plane 9 days ago.

Nov. 23—U.S. Secretary of Defense Laird reports that on November 21, a small U.S. army and air force task force landed at a Sontay prison camp compound 23 miles west of Hanoi, North Vietnam, in a vain attempt to free U.S. prisoners of war thought to be held in the camp. No prisoners were found in the vacated camp.

In Paris, North Vietnamese and Vietcong delegates to the peace talks announce that they will not attend the talks scheduled for November 25; they are protesting the recent U.S. bombing of North Vietnam.

Nov. 27—The Department of Defense reveals that U.S. planes bombed military targets near Hanoi on November 21; the U.S. previously denied reports that raids were staged in that area.

ALGERIA

(See *Canada*)

ARGENTINA

Nov. 12—A 36-hour general strike beginning at noon paralyzes the nation.

AUSTRALIA

Nov. 22—Early returns in yesterday's Senate elections indicate a drop in support for the coalition government of Prime Minister John G. Gorton; the government coalition received 34.7 per cent of the vote; the Labor party received 43.3 per cent; the Democratic Labor party and others pick up the losses from the major parties.

BOLIVIA

Nov. 5—The government takes control of *El Diario*, Bolivia's oldest newspaper, which was seized by workers and employees on October 7, 1970.

BRAZIL

Nov. 6—Press reports indicate that 5,000 persons are being detained in a roundup of suspected terrorists.

Nov. 17—Initial returns from the November 15 nationwide elections show that the pro-government Alliance for National Renewal is leading in 27 of 46 senatorial contests. The only legal opposition party, the Brazilian Democratic Movement, is ahead in 15 races.

BURMA

(See also *China*)

Nov. 14—The government announces that on November 9, Thakin Soe, leader of the Red Flag Communist party, was captured.

Nov. 27—In a column published in *The New York Times*, exiled former Premier U Nu says he will soon signal the Burmese people to revolt.

CAMBODIA

(See also *Intl, War in Indochina*)

Nov. 7—Cheng Heng, the chief of state, says that U.S. President Richard Nixon personally promised to increase military and economic aid to Cambodia.

CANADA

Nov. 2—Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau introduces legislation to Parliament to limit the sweeping powers of the War Measures Act which was invoked on October 16 to suppress terrorism in the Province of Quebec.

Nov. 5—Twenty-four persons are arraigned in Montreal on charges ranging from seditious conspiracy to membership in an illegal association.

Nov. 7—Bernard Lortie, arrested yesterday in Montreal on charges of conspiracy in the kidnapping and murder last month of Pierre Laporte, the Quebec Minister of Justice, testifies at an inquest into Laporte's death.

Nov. 21—The Canadian Press reports that during a 5-day visit by an Algerian economic mission, Canada granted 2 development assistance loans totaling \$1.1 million

to Algeria; in addition, it is announced that Canada will sell up to 37 million bushels of wheat to Algeria.

CHILE

Nov. 3—Salvador Allende Gossens, a Marxist, takes office as the new President of Chile.

Nov. 5—In a nationally televised address, Allende discusses his program which calls for the nationalization of mining activities, the progressive nationalization of banks and large domestic industries, and agrarian reform.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

(See also *Intl, U.N.; Italy; U.S.S.R.*)

Nov. 5—The draft of a new constitution for Communist China is released by Chinese Nationalists in Taipei; presumably Nationalist agents obtained a copy of the document, in which Mao Tse-tung is designated as the Great Leader of the People of All Nationalities, Head of State Under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat and Supreme Commander of the Whole Nation and the Whole Army. The new constitution assigns lifetime supremacy to Mao and perpetuates the role of the military at all levels of national life.

Nov. 6—The government sends a congratulatory message to the Soviet Union on the occasion of the 53d anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution and calls for steps so that "relations between our two countries will become friendly and good-neighborly."

Nov. 14—At the conclusion of Pakistani President Agha Mohammed Yahya Khan's 5-day visit, an agreement for economic co-operation is signed between Communist China and Pakistan.

Nov. 16—*Hsinhua*, the Chinese press agency, reports the arrival of U Thein Maung, the new Burmese Ambassador, in Peking. His arrival raises Burma's representation in Communist China to the ambassadorial level for the first time in 3 years.

Nov. 18—*Tass*, the Soviet press agency, reports that Premier Chou En-lai and Soviet

Ambassador Vasily S. Tolstikov met in Peking today.

Nov. 23—Ivan T. Grishin, a Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, and Li Chiang, his Chinese counterpart, sign a trade and payments agreement in Peking.

Nov. 25—*Hsinhua* reports the signing of a long-term, interest-free loan from China to Rumania; the Rumanian delegation returns home.

COLOMBIA

Nov. 13—The government announces the end of a state of siege that was imposed on April 21, 1970.

CONGO (Kinshasa)

Nov. 4—Following a meeting with President Marien Ngouabi of the Republic of the Congo, President Joseph D. Mobutu announces that on December 15 diplomatic relations between the 2 countries will be restored; they were broken off in 1968.

Nov. 5—The Supreme Court declares that Mobutu was reelected President in balloting last weekend.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Nov. 16—The Foreign Ministry protests to the U.S. Embassy the penetration into Czechoslovak territory of a U.S. helicopter.

Nov. 19—Gustav Husak, leader of the Czechoslovak Communist party, returns from Moscow where he met with Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet party leader.

ECUADOR

Nov. 1—General César Rohn Sandoval, commander of the Air Force, who was kidnapped on October 27, is freed.

Nov. 5—The Defense Ministry announces that a former paratrooper has admitted taking part in the kidnapping of Rohn and has implicated the sons of a former presidential candidate in the plot.

EIRE

Nov. 4—Prime Minister John Lynch wins a vote of confidence in Parliament by a vote of 74 to 67.

EL SALVADOR

Nov. 16—The government announces that it will protest air attacks by the Guatemalan air force on unarmed Salvadoran fishing vessels on November 14.

FRANCE

Nov. 4—The Cabinet decides that public works projects of a regional, departmental or municipal nature will be decided on and carried out at those levels without reference to the national ministries.

Nov. 10—President Georges Pompidou announces the death last night of Charles de Gaulle, World War II leader and former Premier and President of France.

Nov. 12—Representatives from about 80 nations, including U.S. President Richard Nixon and Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny, attend memorial services for de Gaulle at Notre Dame Cathedral in Paris as private services and burial take place near his country home in Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises.

President Nixon meets with David K. E. Bruce, the chief U.S. negotiator at the Paris peace talks, pays a courtesy call on President Pompidou and chats briefly with President Podgorny at a reception.

GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (East)

(See also *Intl, Berlin Crisis*)

Nov. 8—Walter Ulbricht, chairman of the East German Council of State, declares that other states will have to reduce their activities in West Berlin before the East German government will enter talks on easing access to the divided city.

Nov. 25—Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko confers with Ulbricht, Premier Willi Stoph and Foreign Minister Otto Winzer in Berlin.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

(See also *Intl, Berlin Crisis; Poland*)

Nov. 7—Pyotr A. Abrasimov, the Soviet Ambassador to East Germany, sends a protest to British authorities over a sniper's shoot-

ing of a Soviet soldier on duty at the Soviet war memorial in West Berlin; the memorial is in the British sector of West Berlin.

Nov. 9—Ekkehard Weil, a West Berliner, confesses to the November 7 shooting of a Soviet soldier for "political motives."

GREECE

Nov. 29—92 candidates for seats on a consultative commission are designated by some 1,240 electors chosen by the regime's college of electors. Premier George Papadopoulos will choose 46 commission members from the list and appoint 10 additional members.

GUATEMALA

(See also *El Salvador*)

Nov. 13—President Carlos Arana Osorio announces that the government has imposed a 30-day state of siege in an attempt to halt a wave of terrorist violence.

GUINEA

Nov. 22—President Sékou Touré says that Portuguese forces have attacked Guinea; he appeals to U.N. Secretary General U Thant for support from U.N. airborne troops. Government sources in Portugal deny that Portuguese troops are taking part in the invasion.

Nov. 24—Radio broadcasts from Guinea report that "Portuguese fascists and their mercenaries" are continuing their incursions into Guinea.

Nov. 28—President Sékou Touré announces that a Portuguese force has invaded Guinea's Koundara region which borders Portuguese Guinea; he asks U.N. Secretary General U Thant to look into the situation.

Nov. 29—*The New York Times* reports that East European observers have indicated that the purpose of the attacks on Guinea is the destruction of Portuguese Guinea's nationalist movement which operates out of Guinea. Sékou Touré's palace has reportedly been burned as the conflict continues.

ISRAEL

(See *Intl, Middle East; United Kingdom*)

ITALY

Nov. 6—Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie arrives in Rome for a state visit.

Italy and Communist China announce an agreement to establish diplomatic relations; Italy breaks relations with Nationalist China.

Nov. 10—Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko arrives in Rome for a 3-day visit.

Nov. 11—Raffaele Minichiello, a U.S. Marine corporal who hijacked an airliner from California to Italy more than a year ago, is sentenced to 7 and a half years in prison. Minichiello was tried in Italy on charges of kidnapping and unlawful possession of arms since Italy has no statute on airplane hijacking.

Nov. 23—West German Chancellor Willy Brandt arrives in Rome for talks with government leaders.

JAPAN

Nov. 15—About 84 per cent of the eligible voters in the Ryukyu Islands go to the polls to select their first representatives to the Japanese Diet since the U.S. occupied the islands in World War II.

Nov. 16—It is reported that leftist candidates captured 3 of the 5 seats in the lower house in yesterday's elections in Okinawa; the other 2 seats were captured by Liberal-Democrats. A leftist and a Liberal-Democrat have been elected to the upper house.

Nov. 25—The noted Japanese novelist, Yukio Mishima, founder of the right-wing *Tate No Kai* (the Shield Society), and 5 of his followers stage an attack on Japan's Self-Defense Force's Eastern Army Headquarters in Tokyo; Mishima lectures the soldiers at the headquarters on corruption in Japanese politics and then commits suicide.

MALAYSIA

Nov. 26—Defense Ministry spokesmen announce that Malaysian jets have attacked

suspected guerrilla sites in Sarawak for the 2d successive day.

MOROCCO

Nov. 16—The National Front, representing all the major opposition parties in Morocco, issues a statement calling for the immediate withdrawal of all U.S. military personnel based in Morocco.

NIGERIA

Nov. 11—Major General Yakubu Gowon, the head of the Nigerian government, announces a 4-year development plan for Nigeria; the plan calls for industrialization, modernization of agriculture, development of transportation and education and the "meaningful Nigerianization" of foreign companies.

PAKISTAN

(See also *China*)

Nov. 1—Zygfryd Wolniak, a Polish Deputy Foreign Minister, and 3 Pakistanis are killed by an airline van at Karachi International Airport, and a number of people are injured. The driver of the van, which ran into a reception line formed to welcome Polish President Marshal Marian Spychalski, is arrested.

Nov. 3—Police declare that Mohammed Feroze Abdullah, the driver of the van that killed Wolniak, is a Muslim extremist who wished to kill all of the visiting Communist delegation.

Nov. 4—President Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan and his Cabinet approve plans for the construction of a steel mill at Buleji; the mill will be constructed with Soviet technical and economic aid totaling \$200 million.

Nov. 20—American and British cargo planes arrive in Pakistan bringing helicopters to drop supplies to the survivors of the cyclone and tidal wave that struck East Pakistan a week ago. The official death toll of the catastrophe is reported at 150,000 persons.

PHILIPPINES, THE

Nov. 10—Three hundred and twenty delegates are elected to rewrite the constitution, which was drafted in 1935.

Nov. 26—A Bolivian, Benjamin Mendoza y Amor Flores, attacks Pope Paul VI with a knife as the Pope is being greeted by President Ferdinand D. Marcos and church dignitaries at Manila airport; the Pope is not hurt.

POLAND

(See also *Pakistan*)

Nov. 2—West German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel arrives in Warsaw for talks on the establishment of diplomatic relations with Poland.

Nov. 18—Foreign Minister Stefan Jedrychowski and West German Foreign Minister Scheel initial a treaty which includes recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as Poland's western frontier and calls for the normalization of relations between the 2 countries. The treaty must be ratified by both nations.

PORTUGAL

Portuguese Guinea

(See also *Guinea*)

Nov. 16—A military communiqué is issued which says that Portuguese forces killed 14 nationalist guerrillas during the week ending November 8.

RUMANIA

(See also *China*)

Nov. 10—Wladyslaw Gomułka, the Polish Communist party leader, arrives in Bucharest for a 4-day state visit.

SOUTH AFRICA

Nov. 13—South Africa announces a grant to Madagascar of a \$3.2-million, 25-year development loan.

SUDAN, THE

Nov. 16—According to a broadcast on the official Sudanese radio, 3 members of the military regime have been removed from their government and military posts.

SYRIA

- Nov. 13—Baathist party sources confirm earlier reports that President and Premier Nureddin al-Attassi has been placed under house arrest. The Defense Minister, Lieutenant General Hafez al-Assad, is reported to have ordered the arrest. The Syrian Army is said to have detained other prominent officials including Major General Salah al-Jadid, assistant secretary general of the Baath socialist party.
- Nov. 14—Syrian Army tanks and armored cars are deployed around commando camps near Damascus.
- Nov. 16—It is announced over the Damascus radio and television that a new Baath party leadership has been formed; the announcement says that "provisional leadership" will rule until permanent leaders are chosen at a national congress of the Syrian branch of the Baath party.
- Nov. 18—The Egyptian Middle East news agency reports the appointment of Ahmed al-Khatib as head of state.
- Nov. 19—The new Syrian regime announces that Assad has become Premier.
- Nov. 21—Premier Assad names a new 26-man Cabinet.
- Nov. 27—A communiqué released in Cairo announces that Syria has joined the U.A.R.-Libya-Sudan alliance to pool resources "for the battle with Israel."

TANZANIA

- Nov. 5—Julius Nyerere orders the release of 3,484 prisoners to mark his inauguration as President for a 3d term.

TRINIDAD

- Nov. 19—Eric Williams, Prime Minister and Minister of National Security, orders the release of political prisoners; the prisoners were held under state of emergency powers which expire today.

TUNISIA

- Nov. 2—President Habib Bourguiba announces the appointment of Hedi Nouira as the new Premier.

TURKEY

- Nov. 10—Three U.S. Army officers and a Turkish officer are returned to Turkey from the Soviet Union; the 4 had been detained in the Soviet Union for 3 weeks after their plane strayed over Soviet territory and landed 12 miles inside the border.
- Nov. 21—A Turkish court rules that the hijacking of a Soviet plane by 2 Lithuanians on October 15 was a political act and that the 2 cannot be extradited.

U.S.S.R.

- (See also *Intl, United Nations; China; Turkey*)
- Nov. 6—In a nationally televised address, Mikhail A. Suslov, a member of the Soviet Communist party Politburo, assails the existence of U.S. military bases abroad as a threat to Soviet security; he also emphasizes prospects for improved relations with France and West Germany.
- Nov. 7—The 53d anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution is marked in Red Square with a display of military equipment; Boris H. Klosson, chargé d'affaires of the U.S. Embassy, absents himself from the display and reception at the Kremlin in protest against the detention of U.S. officers whose plane violated Soviet airspace on October 21.
- Nov. 15—Soviet scientists, headed by Andrei D. Sakharov, a prominent nuclear physicist, form a Committee for Human Rights. Rules for membership in the group state that only those who are not members of a political party may join.
- Nov. 17—*Tass* reports the landing on the moon of a self-propelled 8-wheel vehicle which was transported to the moon by the unmanned spacecraft Luna 17.
- Nov. 22—Li Hsin-chuan arrives in Moscow to take up his duties as the Communist Chinese Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. The last Chinese Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. left in 1966.
- Nov. 29—In a nationally televised speech, Communist party secretary Leonid Brezhnev expresses optimism about a peace settlement in the Middle East and a Big Four

agreement on Berlin. He denounces the U.S. raids of November 21-22 on North Vietnam.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Nov. 9—Following several days of talks by U.A.R. President Anwar el-Sadat, Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi, the head of the Revolutionary Government of Libya, and Major General Gaafar Mohammed al-Nimeiry, the head of the Sudanese military government, an agreement to work toward a federation of the 3 countries is announced.

Nov. 12—President Sadat is elected chairman of the Arab Socialist Union, Egypt's only political organization. In a speech following the election, President Sadat says that Soviet Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin has promised to increase support to the U.A.R.

Nov. 15—Premier Mahmoud Fawzi submits his resignation and is asked by President Sadat to form a new Cabinet.

Nov. 17—Premier Fawzi selects his new Cabinet which includes 4 deputy premiers.

Nov. 18—The membership of an 11-member National Defense Council is announced: President Sadat is chairman of the council, which will control all decisions and activities relating to the conflict with Israel.

UNITED KINGDOM

Nov. 5—After talks on British policy in the Middle East with Prime Minister Edward Heath and Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Israeli Premier Golda Meir says in a news conference that "there was no meeting of the minds on basic issues."

Nov. 11—An announcement is made in the House of Commons that the government will grant up to \$100 million to save the British aircraft-engine company, Rolls-Royce, Ltd., from financial disaster.

UNITED STATES

Agriculture

Nov. 9—An Agriculture Department report estimates that the total increase in food prices this year will average 5.5 per cent.

Civil Rights and Race Relations

Nov. 3—Negroes win all the major elective offices in Greene County, Alabama; the Negro voter registration in the county is almost 2 to 1 over white registration.

Nov. 8—A curfew is imposed in Henderson, North Carolina, for the 3d consecutive night; and National Guardsmen continue on duty. The unrest results from tension over school desegregation.

Nov. 9—An uneasy calm prevails in Negro neighborhoods in Daytona Beach, Florida, after a weekend of racial violence.

Nov. 12—The National Education Association releases a report criticizing the desegregation policies of public schools in Louisiana and Mississippi and charging continuing discrimination.

Conservation and Pollution

Nov. 2—Harry J. Otway of the Atomic Energy Commission says that small amounts of radioactive plutonium have been found outside the Nevada test site.

Nov. 10—The legislature of Suffolk County, New York, bans the sale in the county of virtually all detergents.

Nov. 13—Attorney General John Mitchell announces that the government has charged the Humble Oil and Refining Company with violations of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 in the operation of oil wells off the coast of Louisiana.

Economy

Nov. 6—The unemployment rate for October, 1970, rose to 5.6 per cent of the labor force, according to a Labor Department report. This is the highest monthly rate since January, 1964.

Nov. 13—The Commerce Department reports that personal income showed a slight decline in October; the report attributes the decline to the General Motors strike. Corporation profits rose slightly in the third quarter of this year.

Nov. 20—Chase Manhattan Bank announces a reduction in its prime rate from 7.25 per cent to 7 per cent.

Nov. 24—The Labor Department reports a rise in the consumer price index for the month of October of 0.5 per cent.

Elections

Nov. 3—Citizens cast their ballots for 435 Congressmen, 35 Senators and 35 governors in the nation-wide mid-term election.

Nov. 4—Returns in yesterday's elections show that incumbent Senator Albert Gore (D., Tenn.) was defeated by Representative William E. Brock 3d (R.); Representative Lowell P. Weicker, Jr., (R., Conn.) defeated incumbent Democratic Senator Thomas Dodd (who ran independently) and the Democratic candidate, Joseph Duffey; Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr. (D., Va.), running as an independent, was re-elected; Democrat Adlai E. Stevenson 3d defeated Senator Ralph Smith (R., Ill.); James L. Buckley, the Conservative candidate who received support from the national Republican administration, defeated Senator Charles Goodell (R.) and Representative Richard Ottinger (D.) for the Senate seat from New York; Senators Edmund Muskie (D., Me.) and Edward Kennedy (D., Mass.) were reelected; former Vice President Hubert Humphrey (D.) was the winner in the race for the Senate seat from Minnesota; Representative John Tunney (D.) defeated Senator George Murphy (R.) for the Senate seat from California.

Returns reveal, also, that the Democrats made a net gain of 11 gubernatorial offices. Republican Governors Winthrop Rockefeller of Arkansas and Claude Kirk, Jr., of Florida, who were running for re-election, were defeated. Former Governor George Wallace, running as a Democrat, was elected for a 2d term as Governor of Alabama.

Speaking to newsmen in Washington, D.C., the President says that Republicans scored a victory in the elections because they will now have an "ideological" working majority in the Senate.

Nov. 8—President Nixon confers with 3 New

York Conservative party leaders in the Bahamas.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, Disarmament, U.N., War in Indochina; France; Turkey; U.S.S.R.*)

Nov. 7—Following a meeting with U.A.R. Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad last night and a meeting today with Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers says that the best way to achieve peace in the Middle East is through talks under the auspices of the U.N.

Nov. 13—White House press secretary Ronald Ziegler, commenting on the question of admission of Communist China to the U.N., says that the U.S. is "opposed to the admission of Communist China at the expense of the expulsion of Nationalist China."

In Washington, President Nixon meets informally with Luis Echeverria Alvarez, the President-elect of Mexico.

Nov. 14—A *New York Times* report says that the U.S. has engaged the Soviet Union in secret diplomacy for 7 weeks to prevent the Soviet Union from basing nuclear-missile submarines or installing nuclear weapons in the Western Hemisphere, particularly at the Cuban port of Cienfuegos.

Nov. 15—South Vietnamese Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky arrives in New York for a 2½-week unofficial visit to the U.S.

Nov. 17—President Nixon confers with Ellsworth Bunker, the U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, at the White House.

State Department officials announce that the U.S. has received private assurances from the Soviet Union that it will not introduce offensive weapons or the bases for such weapons into the Western Hemisphere.

Nov. 18—In a special message to Congress, President Nixon requests a supplemental request for \$1.03 billion in foreign aid for the current fiscal year; a large part of the funds requested are intended for Israel and Cambodia.

Nov. 24—Testifying before the Senate For-

eign Relations Committee, Defense Secretary Laird says that the administration is considering further action to free U.S. prisoners of war held in North Vietnam; and that he would recommend the resumption of full-scale bombing of North Vietnam if the enemy engages in major violations of the tacit understanding that halted the bombing 2 years ago. (See *Intl, War in Indochina.*)

Nov. 25—South Vietnamese Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky attends a reception given by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Nov. 29—Senator J. William Fulbright (D., Ark.) charges that the Defense Department, not the State Department, formulates U.S. foreign policy, particularly in Southeast Asia.

Government

(See also *Elections, Military*)

Nov. 7—Joseph H. Batchford, the director of the Peace Corps, announces the creation of a new Office of Minority Affairs which will develop opportunities for women and minorities in Peace Corps programs.

Nov. 9—A federal district court in Washington, D.C., denies a General Motors request for a restraining order which would have prevented the federal government from forcing the company to notify truck owners of allegedly defective wheels.

Nov. 12—Following announced price increases by Gulf Oil Corporation and the Atlantic Richfield Company, the government announces a major investigation into the prices of crude oil.

Under pressure from conservation, consumer-protection and other special interest groups, the Internal Revenue Service issues new guidelines under which tax exemption will be granted to "public interest law firms," according to Randolph W. Thrower, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

Nov. 13—In Chicago, the U.S. Court of Appeals orders Judge Julius J. Hoffman, who presided at the trial of 7 defendants who were charged with inciting a riot at the 1968 Democratic National Convention, to

hold a hearing to investigate charges that, as presiding judge, he interfered with the jurors' right to exercise impartial judgment.

Hamar H. Budge, chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, tells the staff of the S.E.C. that he will resign, effective at the end of the 1970 session of Congress.

Ronald L. Reed is apprehended by police and F.B.I. agents in Minneapolis, Minnesota; Reed is said to be implicated in a plot to kidnap Minnesota Governor Harold LeVander, hijack an airplane and use hostages to free Angela Davis and other prisoners. (See *U.S., Government*, Oct. 13, *Current History*, December, 1970, p. 378.)

Nov. 16—Congress reconvenes after a recess for elections.

Nov. 17—The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decides that the federal government must show a pressing need for evidence before it can require a journalist to testify at secret grand jury proceedings.

Nov. 19—In a 48-to-35 vote, the Senate approves a farm price support bill which now goes to the President.

Nov. 20—Authoritative administration sources report that Daniel P. Moynihan, counselor to the President, will succeed Charles W. Yost as the U.S. delegate to the U.N.

Nov. 23—Voting 58 to 34, the Senate fails to muster the required two-thirds majority to override President Nixon's veto of a bill to limit campaign spending for radio and television time.

Nov. 25—President Nixon dismisses Walter Hickel from his post as Secretary of the Interior; Fred Russell, the Under Secretary, will function as Acting Secretary; it is reported that the President intends to nominate Rogers C. B. Morton, chairman of the Republican National Committee, to succeed Hickel.

Nov. 27—Six high-level officials of the Department of the Interior are dismissed.

White House press secretary Ronald Ziegler says that Daniel P. Moynihan has decided to return to a post at Harvard University instead of accepting the post of U.S. representative at the U.N.

Nov. 30—President Nixon signs a bill extending price support and acreage control programs, and setting a ceiling on the amount of federal subsidy payment a farmer may receive.

The Census Bureau reports that the 1970 census tallied 204.7 million Americans, a 13.3 per cent rise in population.

Labor

Nov. 3—The 4 A.F.L.-C.I.O. railway unions and the National Railway Labor Conference, which are involved in a wage dispute, agree to an extension of the deadline for a nationwide rail strike; the 6-day extension (to November 10), because of provisions of the Federal Railway Labor Act, would make the earliest strike date December 10.

Nov. 9—The presidential panel which has been mediating the railway labor dispute recommends a wage increase of approximately one-third over a 3-year period and a fundamental reform in the negotiating process for railroad labor disputes; the reform calls for a permanent negotiating unit.

Nov. 12—Representatives of the United Automobile Workers approve a contract agreement with the General Motors Corporation which calls for an estimated 30 per cent increase in wage and fringe benefits over a 3-year period.

Nov. 20—Leonard Woodcock, union president, announces that members of the United Automobile Workers have ratified a contract with General Motors.

Military

Nov. 4—Administration officials report that the only U.S. division on duty in the demilitarized zone of Korea is to be withdrawn; troops positioned to the rear will remain on duty.

Nov. 5—Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard orders the armed forces to stop activating National Guard and Reserve units and then letting them stay idle for long periods of time; he also orders that

hometown units be kept together whenever possible.

Nov. 10—Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird authorizes additional riot control training for National Guardsmen; he also requests additional weapons and protective gear for the guardsmen.

Nov. 20—Staff Sergeant David Mitchell, the first soldier to face a court martial on charges arising from the alleged massacre at Songmy in 1968, is acquitted. (See *Current History Annual*, 1970, p. 21.)

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird says that congressional refusal to provide \$155 million in military aid for Cambodia would retard withdrawals of U.S. troops from South Vietnam.

Science and Space

Nov. 6—A satellite designed to give early warning of missiles fired from the Soviet Union or Communist China towards the United States is launched from Cape Kennedy, Florida.

Supreme Court

Nov. 9—In a 6-to-3 vote, the Court refuses to hear the challenge by the state of Massachusetts to the constitutionality of the war in Vietnam.

VATICAN, THE

Nov. 12—Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko confers for over an hour with Pope Paul VI.

Nov. 27—Pope Paul VI begins a 3,000-mile, 10-day trip to 9 cities in Asia and the Pacific. (See also *Philippines*.)

VIETNAM, REPUBLIC OF (South)


(See *Intl. War in Indochina*)

YUGOSLAVIA

Nov. 18—Deputy Premier Nikola Miljanic resigns.

ZAMBIA

Nov. 10—President Kenneth D. Kaunda takes over foreign banks in Zambia and nationalizes mortgage companies; he announces that the state is taking a controlling interest in private banks.



Countries Of The Middle East

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